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Résumé : Il est courant lorsque l’on conçoit un protocole de supposer qu’il utilise des canaux sûrs sans
se préoccuper de leur implémentation. Le présent document énonce des hypothèses sous lesquelles une
telle pratique est effectivement sûre.
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1 Introduction
When designing a protocol, it is common to assume a secure, confidential, or authentic channel. Authentic
channels may be read but not written in. Symmetrically, confidential channels may be written in but not
read. Secure channels are both authentic and confidential. For example, payment protocols like 3D-
secure are supposed to be run over a secure channel such as TLS. Similarly, many services such as
public key registration assume an authenticated channel. How to implement these secure channels is
left unspecified and, intuitively, the security of a payment protocol should not depend on the particular
choice of implementation of its secure channels. A typical example of a popular and generic realization
of a secure channel is TLS. For authentication, one usually relies on a password-based authentication
or on previously established keys (used e.g. for signature or MACs). Is it safe to use these protocols
in any context? What is a secure or authenticated channel? This paper aims at characterizing channels
that have security properties. For example, assume Q is a secure protocol (e.g. a payment protocol) that
requires a secure channel. Which properties should a protocol P achieve in order to securely realize the
secure channels of Q? These properties should of course be independent of Q since P and Q are typically
designed in totally independent contexts. In the remaining of this introduction, Q will refer to the “main”
protocol while P will refer to a protocol realizing secure channels (for several notions of security).
Our contributions. Our first contribution is a characterization of both secure, confidential, and au-
thenticated channels. We actually characterize what it means for a channel to be readable or not, and
writable or not. Then the realization of a secure channel typically proceeds in two phases. First, some
values are established by the protocol P, for example short-term symmetric keys or MAC keys. Quite
unsurprisingly, we show that these values need to be secret and appropriately shared. Then the messages
of Q are transported or encapsulated using the values established by P. For example, the messages of Q
may be encrypted with a key established by P. We provide a characterization of secure encapsulations
both for secure, confidential, and authentic channels. A key feature of our characterization is that it is
independent of P and Q, which allows for a modular analysis. We show that standard encapsulations (e.g.
typical use of encryption, signatures, or MACs) enjoy the requested properties.
Our second and main contribution is to show how to securely compose protocols. Intuitively, our
main result guarantees that whenever P is a secure key exchange protocol and E is a secure encapsulation
then P ·E Q is as secure as Q where P ·E Q denotes the protocol obtained from Q by implementing its
secure channels using P and E.
The interest of our result is twofolds. First, it provides foundational grounds to a common practice
where protocols are typically designed and studied independently and then combined. We show that such
a practice is actually secure under reasonably light assumptions: primitives shared between P, E, and
Q should be tagged as proposed in [4]. Tagging is a standard practice that avoids message confusion.
Second, our result provides a technique for analyzing a complex protocol: it is sufficient to analyse its
components to deduce security of the whole protocol. To express and prove our result, we have developed
a framework, an extension of the applied-pi calculus [2], that allows to easily talk about protocols roles
and sessions, a missing aspect in the applied-pi calculus.
To illustrate our approach, we show that TLS is a secure implementation of secure channels. Similarly
we show that the BAC protocol [1] is also a secure implementation of a secure channel and may be safely
used with the Passive Authentication (PA) protocol as prescribed for the biometric passport [1]. Using
the CL-Atse tool [17], we analyse several combined protocols. Thanks to our combination result, it is
possible to analyse protocols in isolation instead of their combination, which allows to consider a larger
number of sessions.
Related work. One seminal work on composition is the one of Guttman and Thayer [12]. They show
that two protocols can be composed without one damaging the security of the other as soon as they are
“independent”. However, this independence notion needs to be checked for any protocol execution and
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cannot be statically checked at the protocol specification level. Later, Guttman [10] provides a criterion
on the specification of P and Q such that P can be safely composed with Q. Intuitively, Q should not
break some invariant satisfied by P and conversely. While the work of [10] focuses on authentication and
secrecy properties, [11] more generally devises a framework for defining protocol goals and designing,
step by step, protocols that fulfill them. In [9], the strand space model is used in a modular way, to
analyse protocols components by components. The disjunction criteria cannot be checked statically. All
these approaches provide a framework that allows to reason modularly when analysing the combination
of two protocols P and Q, typically expressing invariants satisfied by P that are shown sufficient to
prove security of Q. This simplifies the proof of P combined with Q but requires the knowledge of both
protocols. Compared to our work, we propose a criteria for a protocol P to securely implement a secure
channel, independently of the protocol Q that will use it (provided primitives are tagged).
Under tagging assumptions similar to ours, it was already shown that P and Q can be safely run in
parallel even if they share long-term keys [6]. In passing, we generalize this result to the case where long-
term keys may be used as payload. [5] explains when two protocols may be used sequentially, with Q
using data established by P. The main difference with our work is that messages may not be transformed
when composing protocols. Therefore, [6, 5] cannot be used to (securely) implement abstract channels.
Note also that [5] may not consider compromised sessions, that is sessions between honest and dishonest
agents. The problem we address here is referred to as sequential composition in [15], where the messages
of Q are used as payloads in the composed protocol P ·E Q. [15] provides a nice exposition of the generic
problem of a protocol Q using a protocol P as subprotocol and lists sufficient (semantical) conditions for
combining two protocols. These conditions require again the knowledge of both P and Q.
Datta et al. (e.g. [7]) have also studied secure protocol composition in a broader sense: protocols
can be composed in parallel, sequentially or protocols may use other protocols as components. However,
they do not provide any syntactic conditions for a protocol P to be safely executed in parallel with other
protocols. For any protocol P’ that might be executed in parallel, they have to prove that the two protocols
P and P’ satisfy each other invariants. Their approach is thus rather designed for component based design
of protocols.
2 Model
Our model is inspired from the applied-pi calculus [2], extended to an explicit notion of roles.
2.1 Messages
Messages are modeled using a typed term algebra. We assume an infinite set of names N = ND ⊎ NH
of base type and a set Ch of names of channel type. The set NH (resp. ND) represents the names
accessible by honest (resp. dishonest) agents. We also a consider an infinite set of variables X and a
finite signature F of function symbols operating and returning terms of base type. More precisely, we
consider F = Fc ⊎ Fcst ⊎ Fkey where Fcst contains only constants, all functions in Fkey are unary, and
Fc = {〈 〉/2, f1/n1, . . . , fk/nk} contains the binary function symbol 〈 〉 used to denote concatenation and
other function symbols fi of arity ni. Terms are defined as names, variables and function symbols applied
to other terms. The set of terms built from N ⊆ N ∪ Ch, X ⊆ X and by applying the function symbols
in F ⊆ F is denoted by T (F,N ∪ X). We denote by st(t) the set of subterms of t. We denote by vars(t)
(resp. names(t)) the set of variables (resp. names) in t. When vars(t) = ∅, we say that t is ground. To
represent events that may occur during a protocol execution, we assume an infinite signature Ev distinct
from F . We say that a term e(t1, . . . , tn) with e ∈ Ev and t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F ,N ∪ X) is an event.
Example 1 A standard signature to represent encryption and signature is Fstd, the signature built from a
finite set of constants, functionsFcstd = {senc/2, aenc/2, sign/2, h/1, 〈〉/2} andFkstd = {pk/1, vk/1}. The
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function symbol senc (resp. aenc) represents the symmetric (resp. asymmetric) encryption. We denote by
pk(s) the public key associated s. The function symbol sign represents the digital signature where vk(s)
is the verification associated to s. We write 〈u, v〉 as syntactic sugar for 〈〉(u, v).
We model the algebraic properties of the cryptographic primitives by a set of inference rules I com-
posed of composition and decomposition rule described as follows:
x1 ... xk
f-comp
f(x1, ..., xk)
〈x1, x2〉
x1
〈x1, x2〉
x2
f(x, u1, . . . , un) v1 ... vm
f-decompx
where for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, u j, vk ∈ T (Fkey,X) and vars(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆ {u1, . . . , un, x}.
For each f ∈ F , the set I contains a unique f-comp rule and there is no f-decomp rule when f ∈ Fkey. Given
a set or sequence of terms S and a term t, the deducibility relation is inductively defined as follows. The
term t is deducible from S , denoted S ⊢ t, when t ∈ S ∪ Fcst ∪ ND or there exists a substitution σ and an
inference rule in I with premisses u1, . . . , un and conclusion u such that t = uσ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
S ⊢ uiσ.
Example 2 Continuing Example 1, we define the set Istd of decomposition rules as follows.
senc(x, y) y
x
aenc(x, pk(y)) y
x
sign(x, y) vk(y)
x
〈x, y〉
x
〈x, y〉
y
We have that senc(〈a, c〉, k), k ⊢ a but aenc(〈a, c〉, pk(k)), pk(k) 0 a.
2.2 Agents
In standard process algebra (e.g. [2]), the notion of agents is usually implicit. Typically, a process that
models the behavior of the different honest agents is a single process where all agents are implicitly
represented. However, to model protocol composition, we need to explain how to compose each role
and thus we need to talk about each agent separately. Therefore, we explicit the presence of agents in
our model. Interestingly, our model may also be used to specify semi-honest agents which may directly
communicate with the attacker during the protocol execution, still hiding some secrets from him. We
consider an infinite set of agents Agt = {A, B, . . .} = AgtH ⊎ AgtD where AgtH and AgtD represent
respectively honest and dishonest agents. Each agent possesses private data such as keys. Therefore,
we consider NAgt a subset of N as an infinite partition NAgt =
⊎
A∈AgtNA where NA intuitively are the
names accessible by the agent A. By convention, k[A] denotes a name in NA.
2.3 Protocols
In the spirit of [2], we model protocols through a process algebra. We represent explicitly confidential,
secure, and authenticated channels. Formally, we partition the set of channels into three infinite sets
Ch = Cha ⊎ Chc ⊎ Chs ⊎ Chp where Cha,Chc,Chs,Chp respectively represent the sets of authenticated,
confidential, secure and public channels. The syntax of our calculus is as follows:
Roles of agent A
RA,R
′
A
:= 0 | outA(c, u).RA | inA(c, v).RA | new k.RA | eventA(ev).RA
Channel and agent declarations
C,C′ := RA | newta c.C | C | C
′
Processes
P,Q := C | P | Q | !P | ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).P
where c ∈ Ch, A ∈ Agt, ta is the tuple of agents in C such that c occurs in their role, k is name,
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(P | outA(c, u).RA,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | RA,Φ
′, µ′, θ) where Φ′ = Φ if c ∈ Chc ∪ Chs Out
else Φ′ = Φ · [u] and µ′ = rect(c, u, µ) if c < Chp else µ
′ = µ
(P | inA(c, v).RA,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | RAσ,Φ, µ, θ) if there exists σ such that In
dom(σ) = vars(v) and either vσ ∈ cµ or else c ∈ Chp ∪ Chc and Φ ⊢ vσ
(P | new k.RA,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | RA{
k′/k},Φ, µ, θ) New-k
with k′ fresh in NH if A ∈ AgtH else k
′ ∈ ND
(P | newta c.C[RA1 , . . . ,RAn],Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | [R
′
A1
, . . . ,R′
An
],Φ, µ, θ′) New-c
∀i,R′
Ai
= RAi if c < ch(RAi) else R
′
Ai
= RAi {
cAi /c} with cAi ∈ Chp if ta ∩AgtD , ∅ else
cAi ∈ S ∪
⋃
B∈ta θ(c, B, ta) r θ(c, Ai, ta) and S ⊆ Cha fresh (resp. Chc, Chs) if c ∈ Cha
(resp. Chc, Chs). Moreover, θ = θ
′ if ta ∩AgtD , ∅ else θ
′ = recc({(cA, A)}A∈ta, ta, c, θ).
(P | !Q,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | !Q | Qρ,Φ, µ, θ) with ρ a fresh renaming of vars(Q) Repl
(P | eventA(ev).R,Φ, µ, θ)
ev
−→ (P | R,Φ, µ, θ) Event
(P | ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).Q,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | Qσ,Φ · S , µ, θ) Agent
with σ = {A
′
/A}, A
′
< f a(Q), S = Kpubσ if A
′ ∈ A ∩AgtH else S = Kpubσ · Kprvσ
Figure 1: Semantics of configuration
u and v are terms, ev is an event, Kpub and Kprv are sets of ground terms with names(Kpub) ⊆ NA,
names(Kprv) ⊆ NAgt andA ⊆ Agt.
The behavior of an agent A is described in a role RA that consists of a sequence of inputs, outputs,
creations of names and emissions of events. The role outA(c, u).RA outputs the term u on the channel c
and then behaves like RA. The role inA(c, v).RA inputs a message from channel c and expects it to be an
instance of v. The role new k.RA generates a fresh name k. Processes express how the roles of different
agents are combined. The process newta c allocates an abstract channel to the agents in ta. The process
P | Q expresses the parallel execution of P and Q. The process !P represents the replication of P. The
process ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).P selects a new agent A amongst A. The set Kpub typically indicates the
public keys of A while Kprv contains the (secret) long term keys known by A. The variables in a role
are uniquely bound by the first input in which they appear. The channels are bound by the operators
new . The agents in a process are also bound by agent creation. In a protocol, we assume that a name or
variable is syntactically bound only once. A variable (resp. agent, channel) that is not bound in P is free.
We denote by f a(P), ba(P), f v(P), bv(P), f n(P) and bn(P) the sets of free and bound agents, variables
and names in P respectively. We say that P is closed when f v(P) = ∅. Given a process P and an agent A,
we denote by namesA(P) and chA(P) the sets of names, channels that occur in the roles of A in P.
A role is executable if it only outputs terms that may be deduced from its inputs, the generated values
(nonces and keys), and the long-term keys used in the role.
Definition 1 Let RA = r1. . . . .rn be a role of an agent A. We say that RA is executable when for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if ri = outA(c, u) then names(r1, . . . , ri) ∪ S ⊢ u where S = {v | j < i ∧ (r j = inA(d, v) ∨ r j =
new v)}. A process P is executable when all the roles in P are executable.
The state of a protocol during its execution is represented by a configuration (P,Φ, µ, θ) where P is
a closed process, Φ is a sequence of ground terms representing the knowledge of the attacker, µ is a
mapping from channels to sets of terms representing the messages sent over non-public channels and θ is
a mapping from triplets of channel, agent, tuple of agents to sets of channels. The semantics is given in
Figure 1. The rule Out indicates that the attacker obtainsmessages on public or authenticated channels. In
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this rule, rect(c, t, µ) is the mapping µ′ where t was recorded as being sent over c. Formally, µ′(c′) = µ(c′)
for any c′ , c and µ′(c) = µ(c) ∪ {t}. With rule In the attacker can inject on c any message that he can
deduce from his knowledge when c is a public or confidential channel. He can also relay any message
that was previously sent on c. The rule New-k generates a fresh name ofNH orND depending on whether
the agent A is honest or not. The rule New-c allocates to the role of an agent a channel possibly fresh or
that has already been used by other roles in different sessions. In this rule, recc(S , ta, c, θ) is the mapping
θ in which we record the channels allocated to the agents. Formally, θ′(c′, A′, ta′) = θ(c′, A′, ta′) for any
A′ < ta′ or (c′, ta′) , (c, ta), and θ′(c, A, ta) = θ(c, A, ta) ∪ {d} for any (d, A) ∈ S . The rule Agent selects
an agent fromA and adds Kpub to the knowledge of the attacker. Additionally, if the agent is dishonest,
the rules addsKprv. When (P,Φ, µ, θ)
e1
−→ . . .
en
−→ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′), we write (P,Φ, µ, θ)
e1·...·en
====⇒ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′).
Example 3 An electronic passport is a paper passport containing a RFID chip that stores most of the
information printed on the passport. The protocols used to access these private data are specified in the
International Civil Aviation Organization standard [1]. Before exchanging any private data, an electronic
passport and a reader must establish session keys through a key-exchange protocol, called Basic Access
Control (BAC), that prevents eavesdropping on further communication. The BAC protocol relies on two
keys ke and km that are printed on the passport and thus can be obtained by the reader through optical
scanning. We described below the BAC protocol, between a passport (P) and a reader (R). We assume
encrypted messages to be tagged with a. The use of tagging will be explained later on.
R → P : challenge
P → R : nP
R → P : 〈senc(〈a, nR, nP, kR〉, ke),mac(〈a, senc(〈a, nR, nP, kR〉, ke)〉, km)〉
P → R : 〈senc(〈a, nP, nR, kP〉, ke),mac(〈a, senc(〈a, nP, nR, kP〉, ke)〉, km)〉
After receiving a challenge command from the reader, the passport generates a fresh name nP that will
be used to verify the authenticity of the messages he will receive later on. Upon receiving nP, the reader
generates two nonces nR, kR and sends back to the passport all three nonces encrypted with the key ke and
a mac with the key km. The nonce nR has also an authenticity purpose whereas kR will be the reader’s
contribution to the session keys. The passport then checks the mac using km and the cipher by decrypting
it using ke and verifying the presence of nP in the plain text. If all verifications succeed, the passport
generates a nonce kP, the passport’s contribution to the session keys, and sends it to the reader. At the
end of the protocol, both reader and passport know kR and kP that they use to generate two session keys
f1(kR, kP) and f2(kR, kP). In our syntax, the roles of the reader (RR) and of the passport (RP) can be
expressed as follows.
RP = inP(c, challenge).new nP.outP(c, nP).inP(c, 〈M,mac(〈a,M〉, km[P])〉).
new kP.outP(c, 〈N,mac(〈a,N〉, km[P])〉).0
RR = outR(c, challenge).inR(c, z).new kR.new nR.outR(c, 〈U,mac(〈a,U〉, km[P])).
inR(c, 〈V,mac(〈a,V〉, km[P])〉).0
with c ∈ Chp, M = senc(〈a, x, nP, y〉, ke[P]), N = senc(〈a, nP, x, kP〉, ke[P]), U = senc(〈a, nR, z, kR〉,
ke[P]) and V = senc(〈a, z, nR,w〉, ke[P]). An honest reader communicating with unbounded number of
passports, possibly dishonest, can be modeled in our calculus as the process:
BAC = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]}).(RP | RR)
where P is an infinite set of agents containing honest and dishonest agents and R < P. The following
trace would correspond to the execution of a session with a dishonest passport I and a session of an
honest one A both in P.
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(BAC, ∅, ∅, ∅)→∗ (BAC | ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]}).(RP | RR), ∅, ∅, ∅)
→ (BAC | RPσA | RRσA, ∅, ∅, ∅)
→∗ (BAC | RPσA | RRσA | RPσI | RRσI , [ke[I], km[I]], ∅, ∅)
→ (BAC | RPσA | RRσA | RPσI | Q, [ke[I], km[I], challenge], ∅, ∅)
→∗ . . .
where PσA = A, PσI = I and σA, σI also are fresh renaming of bound variables and names and RRσI =
outI(c, challenge).Q. By convention the empty mapping µ = ∅ (resp. θ = ∅) denotes the mapping that
maps any argument to the emptyset: µ(c) = ∅ (resp. θ(c, A, ta) = ∅) for any c, A, ta.
3 Composition
In the previous section, we have defined an abstract notion of confidential, secure, and authenticated
channels. In practice, such channels are realized through cryptographic means. Agents first execute some
key establishment protocol in order to generate secret session keys. Then they encapsulate the messages
supposedly sent over a channel using these session keys. A standard case for secure channels consists
in using session keys to encrypt subsequent messages. How to encrypt the message is defined by the
encapsulation. In Section 3.1, we provide a generic definition of encapsulations and identify properties
needed for encapsulations to allow for authentication, confidential, and secure channels. We continue
in Section 3.2 by characterizing the composition of a key establishment protocol with a process using
abstract channels.
3.1 Encapsulation
For our composition result, we tag encapsulations and processes. These tags are used to distinguish the
parts of a message that correspond to encapsulations from the ones coming from processes. Formally, a
tag is a constant from Fcst, hence known to the attacker. Given a set Tag ⊆ Fcst, we say that a term t is
a Tag-term when for all t′ ∈ st(t), if t′ = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈ Fc\{〈 〉} and some terms t1, . . . , tn then
t1 = 〈a, u〉 for some term u and a ∈ Tag.
Definition 2 A Tag-encapsulation is a pair (E,F) where E is a Tag-term of T (F ,X) and F ⊆ T (Fkey,X)
such that vars(E) = {x, x1, . . . , xn}, {E, x1, . . . , xn} ⊢ x and for all t ∈ st(E),
• if t = f(v) with f ∈ Fkey then v ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ Fcst
• if t = f(w, t1, . . . , tn) and there exists a f-decomposition rule with f(x, u1, . . . , un), v1, . . . , vm as
premises then for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, v j = g(y) and y ∈ vars(ui) implies
ti ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ Fcst. Intuitively, if a f-decomposition rule may be applied to a subterm of an
encapsulation using a non atomic key g(ti) then ti must be a variable or a constant.
We denote x by tE and (x1, . . . , xn) by XE. Given two encapsulations (E,F) and (E
′,F′), we write E ∼ E′
when there exists a renaming ρ such that Eρ = E′, Fρ = F′, tEρ = tE′ and XEρ = XE′ . We denote by
E(t, t1, . . . , tn) the term obtained from E by substituting x by t and xi by ti.
In an encapsulation (E,F), the variable tE will be instantiated by the message sent on the channel
implemented by the encapsulation whereas the variables in XE will be instantiated by the session keys.
Note that {E, x1, . . . , xn} ⊢ x indicates that an encapsulated messages may always be retrieved using the
session keys. The terms in F represent the public keys that can be used to deduce the term encapsulated
or to generate an encapsulation with a new message without revealing the session keys.
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Example 4 In Example 3, we described how the session keys f1(kR, kP) and f2(kR, kP) are established in
the BAC protocol. The ICAO standard states that in any other protocol executed after BAC, the messages
exchanged should be of the form 〈u,mac(〈b, u〉, f1(kR, kP))〉 with u = senc(〈b,M〉, f2(kR, kP)) for some
data M and tag b. This represents in fact the encapsulation of M with the session keys f1(kR, kP) and
f2(kR, kP). In our formalism, the encapsulation is defined as (EBAC, ∅) where EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈b, t〉, x2)〉
with t = senc(〈b, x〉, x1), tEBAC = x and XEBAC = (x1, x2).
We use tags to distinguish the encapsulations from the messages actually sent over the network.
However, a process can implement different types of channels using different encapsulations with the
same tags. We need to ensure that the security of an encapsulation is not compromised when used with
other encapsulations. Therefore, to state the different properties that encapsulations must satisfy, we
consider a set of encapsulations and not only a unique one.
These conditions are easily met by standard encapsulations.
Definition 3 Let Se = Sa ⊎ Sc ⊎ Ss be a set of Tag-encapsulations. We say that Se allows authentic,
confidential and secure channels if the following properties are satisfied: Let (E1,F1), . . . , (En,Fn) ∈ Se.
Assume that the variables in E1, . . . ,En are disjoint. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) =
vars(E1, . . . ,En) and letΦ be a ground frame such that Tag∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Let I be the set of i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ.
1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀u ∈ T (Fkey,XEiσ), if Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ u then Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ u.
2. For all i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀u ∈ st(Ei)rX, ∀v ∈ st(Ei′ )rX, if u and v are unifiable and root(u) , {〈 〉}
then img(mgu(u, v)) ⊂ X.
Moreover, an encapulation is authentic, that is (Ei,Fi) ∈ Sa if it satisfies the properties [Can read]
and [Cannot write]. An encapulation is confidential, that is (Ei,Fi) ∈ Sc if it satisfies the properties
[Cannot read] and [Can write]. Finally, an encapulation is secure, that is (Ei,Fi) ∈ Sc if it satisfies the
properties [Cannot read] and [Cannot write].
For all ground substitution σ′ such that Tag ∩ st(σ′) = ∅, if we denote J = I − i then
3. [Can read] [Ei] · Fi ⊢ tEi
4. [Cannot read] Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ implies Φ · [tEkσ]k∈J ⊢ tEiσ ∨ ∃x ∈ XEi .Φ · [tEkσ]k∈J ⊢ xσ
5. [Can write] Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′ is equivalent to ϕ ∨
(
Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ tEiσ
′ ∧ Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ Fiσ
′
)
6. [Cannot write] Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′ implies either ϕ or the following property:
∃x ∈ XEi .Φ
′ ⊢ xσ′ ∧
(
(∃ j ∈ N.tEiσ
′ = tE jσ ∧ XEiσ
′ ∩ XE jσ , ∅) ∨Φ
′ ⊢ tEiσ
′)
)
where ϕ = ∃ j ∈ N.(Ei ∼ E j ∧ Eiσ
′ = E jσ), N = {1, . . . , n} and Φ
′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I .
The set Sa (resp. Sc, Ss) represents the sets of encapsulations that can be used to implement authentic
(resp. confidential, secure) channels. Property 1 indicates that the session keys or their associated public
keys cannot be retrieved directly from an encapsulation. Different encapsulations may use for instance
the same encryption scheme. However, Property 2 prevents a part of an encapsulation to be mistaken as
session key for another encapsulation. Properties 3 to 6 model the access control of an encapsulation. In
particular, the term tE of an encapsulation allowing reading access can be derived from the encapsulationE
and its public keys F (Property 3). On the other hand, the term tE of an encapsulation not allowing reading
access should not be derived from the encapsulation without knowing the session keys XE (Property 4).
Property 5 indicates that an encapsulation allowing writing access can be deduced only if it was already
sent on the network (expressed by formula ϕ) or by generating it from its public keys F and the term
tE encapsulated. Lastly, Property 6 models that an encapsulation not allowing writing access cannot be
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generated by an attacker unless already given or unless some of the session keys in XE are known. In the
latter, Property 6 also states that when the term tE is not known to the attacker then he must have extracted
it from encapsulations previously received.
Most common encapsulations satisfy the requested properties. The following encapsulations are:
authentic: Esign = sign(〈aEsign, x〉, x1) and Emac = 〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, x1〉)〉;
confidential: Eaenc = aenc(〈aEaenc, x〉, pk(x1));
secure: ETLS = senc(〈aETLS, x〉, x1), EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈aEBAC, t〉, x2)〉 with t = senc(〈aEBAC, x〉, x1), and
Esigncrypt = sign(〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x〉, pk(x1))〉, x2).
where aEsign, aEmac, aEaenc, aETLS, aEBAC, aEsigncrypt are constants.
Moreover, the set {(Esign, {vk(x1)}), (Emac, ∅), (Eaenc, {pk(x1)}), (ETLS, ∅), (EBAC, ∅), (Esigncrypt, ∅)} allows-
for authentic, confidential and secure channels.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is available in Appendix B. In the rest of this paper, we assume the existence
of a set of encapsulations Se allowing authentic, secure and confidential channels.
3.2 Composition of protocols
Encapsulations use session keys, which are established by a key exchange protocol. To express the
requested property of this protocol, we need to annotate it with events that specify which keys are estab-
lished for which channels and agents. Considering a context of channel and agent declarations C and a
set of channels S , we denote by C|S the context C where all newta c with c ∈ S are removed. We denote
by TAgt the set of tuples of agents. We consider special events Ev = {ev1, ev2, . . . ∈ Ev}.
Definition 4 Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] be a process with C an agent and channel declaration context
such that R1, . . . ,Rn are roles of agents A1, . . . , An respectively. Let S be a set of channels such that
channels(C) ∩ S = ∅. Let ρ be a mapping from S to TAgt × Se. We say that a process P˜ is an annotation
of P under ρ if P˜ = C[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
R′
i
= Ri.eventAi (evi(c1, ta1, ts1, tp1)). . . . .eventAi (evi(cm, tam, tsm, tpm))
where {c1, . . . , cm} = {c ∈ dom(ρ) | cρ = (ta, (E,F)) ∧ Ai ∈ st(ta)} and ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, c jρ = (ta j, (E,F)),
ts j = (u1, . . . , u|XE|), tp = F(u1, . . . , u|XE|) for some (E,F) and terms u1, . . . , u|XE| such that if c ∈ Cha (resp.
Chc, Chs) then (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels.
At the end of each role Ri, we add the events evi for the channels c1, . . . , cm that the agent is supposed
to establish. Events evi(c, ta, ts, tp) are composed of four elements: a channel c that the agent wants to
instantiate, a tuple of agents ta indicating who is sharing the channel c, a tuple of session keys ts that will
be used in the encapsulation (E,F) to implement c, and lastly a tuple tp of public keys associated to the
session keys and F. Typically, we will require that the session keys in ts remain secret for honest agents
while the public keys are indeed public.
Example 5 Continuing Example 3 and thanks to Theorem 3.1, the encapsulation (EBAC, ∅) provides the
passport and reader with a secure channel, denoted cs ∈ Chs, once BAC has been executed. The fact
that BAC is supposed to establish a secure channel for P and R is expressed by the mapping ρ = {cs →
((P,R), (E, ∅))}. The corresponding annotation of BAC under ρ is as follows:
˜BAC = CBAC[RP.eventP(ev1(cs, (P,R), (f1(y, kP), f2(y, kP))))
| RR.eventR(ev2(cs, (P,R), (f1(kR,w), f2(kR,w))))]
where CBAC[_] = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P], data[P]})._ . Note that the session keys are
different and reflect the respective views on the session keys of the passport and the reader.
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Definition 5 Let C and C′ be two channel and agent declaration contexts. We say that C and C′ are
composable if there exist contexts C1,C2,C
′
1
,C′
2
such that C1 and C
′
1
are sequences of agent declarations
with ba(C1)∩ ba(C
′
1
) = ∅, C = C1[C2], C
′ = C′
1
[C′
2
] and C2,C
′
2
only differ from the content of Kpub, Kprv
in the instances of ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).
We define their composition, denoted CC,C
′
, as the context C1[C
′
1
[C3]] with C3 being the context C2
where all instances of ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv) are replaced by ag(A,A,Kpub ∪ Kpub
′,Kprv ∪ Kprv
′) and
ag(A,A,Kpub
′,Kprv
′) is in C′
2
.
The composability of the channel and agent declaration contexts ensures that the roles of the process
Q can be sequentially composed with the roles of the process P. For instance, they should have similar
replications, agent declarations or even channel declarations. However, we do not require that an agent in
P and Q to have the same private (Kprv) or public (Kpub) data. We also allow an agent to be declared in
one context but not in the other one if declared upfront.
Example 6 One of the protocols that are executed after BAC is the Passive Authentication protocol which
provides an authentication mechanism proving that the content of the RFID chip is authentic. In fact the
ICAO standard also indicates that the chip must contain a signature by the Document Signer authority
(D) of a hash of the private data data[P], sod
de f
= sign(〈a, h(〈a, data[P]〉)〉, sk[D]). During the Passive
Authentication protocol, after receiving on the secure channel a challenge from the reader, the passport
sends back this signature that is checked by the reader.
R →sec P : read
P →sec R : 〈data, sign(〈a, h(〈a, data〉)〉, sk)
where sk is the signing key of the Document Signer authority. In our calculus, the roles of the reader (QR)
and of the passport (QP) can be described as follows:
QP = inP(cs, read).outP(cs, 〈data[P], sod〉)
QR = outR(cs, read).inR(cs, 〈x
′, sign(〈a, h(〈a, x′〉)〉, sk[D])〉)
The complete representation of the system is given by PA = CPA[new cs.(QP | QR)] where CPA is the
following context:
CPA = ag(D, {D}, {vk(sk[D])}, {sk[D]}).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {data[P]})._
Continuing Example 5, CPA and CBAC are composable and C
CPA ,CBAC is the context:
CCPA ,CBAC = ag(D, {D}, {vk(sk[D])}, {sk[D]}).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P], data[P]})._
Let S be a set of channels. Let ρ be a mapping from S to TAgt ×Se. We say that two processes P and
Q are composable under ρ if P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn], Q = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] where Ri,R
′
i
are roles of the same
agent Ai for i = 1 . . .n, C and C
′|S are composable and for all c ∈ dom(ρ), if cρ = (ta, (E,F)) then for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, c ∈ chAi(Q) is equivalent to Ai ∈ ta. This reflects the fact that agents using channel c should
be explicitly listed as authorized agents for c.
The composability between P and Q ensures that the agents in Q sharing abstract authentic, confiden-
tial and secure channels are correctly represented in ρ.
Definition 6 Let S be a set of channels. Let ρ be a mapping from S to TAgt × Se. Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn]
and Q = C′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] two closed composable processes under ρ.
For all P˜ = C[R˜1, . . . , R˜n] annotations of P under ρ, the implementation of Q by P˜ through ρ, denoted
P˜ ·ρ Q, is the process C0[R1.R
′′
1
, . . . ,Rn.R
′′
n ] where C0 = C
C,C′ |S and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R′′
i
is defined as
R′
i
where all instances of outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) are replaced by outA(cpub,Eσ) (resp. inA(cpub,Eσ))
when cρ = (ta, (E,F)), tEσ = u and eventA(evi(c, ta,XEσ,Fσ)) is in R˜i for some substitution σ.
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Example 7 Continuing Example 6, the implementation of PA by ˜BAC through ρ is thus the process
˜BAC ·ρ PA = CCPA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P
| RR.Q
′
R
] where Q′
P
and Q′
R
are defined as follows:
Q′
P
= inP(cpub,EBAC(read,K1,K2)).outP(cpub,EBAC(〈data[P], sod〉,K1,K2))
Q′
R
= outR(cpub,EBAC(read,K
′
1
,K′
2
)).inR(cpub,EBAC(〈x, sign(〈a, h(〈a, x〉)〉, sk[D])〉,K
′
1
,K′
2
))
with K1 = f1(y, kP), K2 = f2(y, kP), K
′
1
= f1(kR,w), K
′
2
= f2(kP,w). Note that the ICAO standard describes
in fact the Passive Authentication protocol as the process C[Q′
P
| Q′
R
] (without tags). Thanks to our result,
we may study the simpler process C[new cs.(QP | QR)].
4 Security property
It is easy to state secrecy in our formalism, using a special event Sec ∈ Ev: any term occurring in a Sec
event should remain secret unless the corresponding session involves a dishonest agent.
Definition 7 Let Q be closed process containing contains some events of the form Sec(t, (A1, . . . , An))
where t is a term and A1, . . . , An are some agents. Let Φ be a closed frame. We say that Q preserves
secrecy if for all (Q, ∅, ∅, ∅)
ev1·...·evm
======⇒ (Q′,Φ′, µ′, θ′), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if evi = Sec(t
′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n)) for
some t′ and some honest agents A′
1
, . . . , A′n then Φ
′
0 t′.
We may also specify the properties requested from a key exchange protocol P: P should preserve the
secrecy of the session keys occurring in its events and should ensure that the associated public keys are
public. Moreover, P also needs to ensure that a session key cannot be used to implement two different
channels and that honest agents sharing a channel will share the same session keys for this channel. In
such a case, we say that P is a secure channel establishment protocol.
Definition 8 Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] be a closed process. Let P˜ be an annotation of P under some mapping
ρ. We say that P˜ is a secure channel establishment protocol when for all (P˜, ∅, ∅, ∅)
e1·...·em
====⇒ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′),
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ei = ev(c, ta, (s1, . . . , sℓ), (u1, . . . , uq)) such that ev ∈ Ev, all agents in ta are honest
then for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, Φ′ 0 sk and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, Φ
′ ⊢ uk. Moreover, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if
ev j = ev
′(c′, ta′, (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
), (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′)) for some ev
′ ∈ Ev, some channel c′, some tuple ta′ of agents
and some tuples (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′) of terms then
• either ta , ta′ or c , c′ or ev = ev′ implies ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
• or one of the two following properties is satisfied :
– (s1, . . . , sℓ) = (s
′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u1, . . . , uq) = (u
′
1
, . . . , u′q′).
– ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
.
The first item indicates that the session keys used for a channel between some honest agents are
necessarily different from session keys used for a different channel between any kind of agents, whether
they are honest, dishonest or a mix of both. The second item requires that for matching channels and sets
of agents, either the session keys perfectly match or they are all different.
We are now ready to state our main result: if P is a secure channel establishment protocol and if
Q preserves secrecy using some secure, confidential, or authentic channels, then Q may safely use P to
implement its channels.
Let tagA and tagB be two disjoint sets of tags. LetSe be a set of tagA-encapsulation allowing authentic,
confidential, and secure channels. Let ρ be a mapping from channels to TAgt × Se. Let P and Q be
two closed executable composable tagB-processes under ρ such that P and Q do not share names and
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f a(P) = f a(Q) = ∅. Let P˜ be an annotation of P under ρ. If P˜ is secure and Q preserves secrecy then
P˜ ·ρ Q preserves secrecy as well.
For simplicity, we prove secure composition w.r.t. secrecy properties but we believe that our result
could be easily extended to trace properties.
Proof[Sketch of proof] The proof first relies on that fact that the reachability properties are preserved
by disjoint parallel composition. In particular, the process P˜ | Q is a secure channel establishment
protocol and preserves secrecy. The rest of the proof consists in showing that any trace of P˜ ·ρ Q is also
a trace of P˜ | Q with a frame that induces a similar attacker knowledge. More specifically, properties
from Definition 3 ensure that tagB-terms generated by the attacker or obtained from the encapsulations in
P˜ ·ρQ do not give any relevant knowledge to the attacker and can be replaced by fresh names. This allows
us to obtain a trace without tagB-terms and so without encapsulations. Lastly, since P˜ | Q is a secure
channel establishment protocol, we can always match two encapsulations having same session keys with
the corresponding abstract channel in P˜ | Q.
Example 8 Continuing Example 7, the annotation under ρ of the Basic Access Control ˜BAC is secure
and the Passive Authentication CPA[new cs.(QP.eventP(Sec(data[P], (P,R))) | QR)] preserves secrecy
(of the private data). Hence, thanks to Theorems 3.1 and 4, the implementation of PA by ˜BAC through ρ,
CCPA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P
.eventP(Sec(data[P], (P,R))) | RR.Q
′
R
], preserves secrecy.
5 Case studies
We show that our approach can be applied to deployed protocols such as the biometric passport or TLS
applied to 3D-secure. As an application, we show that the automatic analysis through the CL-Atse tool
can be significantly speed up when the number of sessions goes higher.
5.1 Biometric passport
Our running example is the combination of the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol with the Passive
Authentication (PA) protocol from the electronic passports. Actually, PA is not the only protocol executed
after BAC. Another authentication mechanism is used to prevent cloning of the passport chip. This proto-
col, called Active Authentication protocol (AA), also uses the same session keys and encapsulations than
PA. Using the CL-Atse tool [17], we show for different scenarios that BAC is a secure channel establish-
ment protocol and that PA and AA both preserve secrecy. Thanks to our main result, this yields security
of the combined protocol, where BAC implements the secure channel of PA and AA. For comparaison
purpose, we also analyze directly the combined protocol with CL-Atse. These analysis are reported in
Section 5.3
5.2 TLS and 3D-secure
Our results also apply to other complex systems. We study the Visa 3D-secure protocol [16] used by
several websites for internet banking and that relies on secure channels implemented by the well known
TLS protocol. The Visa 3D secure protocol is an authenticated payment method between a card holder
and a merchant during an electronic payment. This protocol aims to ensure authentication of the card
holder as well as confirmation that the card holder is authorized by his bank to make the payment. Lastly,
the protocol also aims to ensure the secrecy of the card holder’s banking information, the payment amount
and other data.
The protocol involves four types of participants: a card holder (C), a merchant (M), a centralized
structure called Visa Directory Servers (DS) and the card issuer’s servers called Access Control Servers
(ACS). The main role of the Visa Directory Servers is to transfer card holder’s information between the
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Access Control Servers and the merchant. In itself, the 3D secure protocol is already a complex protocol
with multiple exchanges of messages. But the protocol also requires most messages to be exchanged
trough a TLS channel. More specifically, messages of the 3D secure protocol shall be encrypted with a
symmetric session key previously established with TLS. In our model, this means that the messages are
encapsulated by (ETLS, ∅), as defined in Theorem 3.1.
The well known TLS protocol [14, 8] aims at establishing a secure channel between a client and a
server. Using the CL-Atse tool, we show that TLS (Basic TLS handshake, in the RSA mode) is indeed a
secure channel establishment protocol.
Note that for one session of the Visa 3D secure protocol yields four sessions of the TLS protocol: one
channel between C and M, between C and ACS, between ACS and DS and finally between M and DS.
This renders the verification of even one session of 3D secure protocol with the channels implemented by
TLS a complex task (more than thirty five messages exchanged per session).
5.3 Analysis with CL-Atse
We applied the automatic verification tool CL-Atse [17] on a Dell T1700 computer (16 Go RAM, 3.40
GHz CPU). The corresponding time of analysis are displayed below.
Computation time (in seconds, timeout set to 24 hours)
protocols TLS & 3D secure BAC & PA BAC & AA BAC & PA & AA
type of analysis S C S C S C S C
number of 1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.2
sessions 2 1350 time out 6.2 1.6 6.2 1.6 6.5 43156
considered 3 time out time out 9133 time out 9133 time out 9185 time out
Amongst the tools able to verify security protocols for a bounded number of sessions, CL-Atse is
well known and considered to be one of the fastest. However, in the case of the 3D-secure protocol, the
tool already fails to verify one session with all channels implemented as we reached a time out set to 24
hours of computation. Thus, to obtain meaningful results with the 3D-secure protocol, we considered
the case where only the channel between the card holder and the merchant is implemented. Already in
this case, we can see a clear benefit from analyzing separately 3D-secure and TLS when considering
two sessions. Indeed, the verification can be performed under 25 minutes when analysing the protocols
separately whereas the tool was reaching a time out when considering the complete system. We obtain
similar results with the Basic Access Control protocol, the Active Authentication protocol and the Passive
Authentication protocol. Note that for verification tools handling unbounded number of sessions (e.g.
ProVerif [3], Tamarin [13]), the gain in time would probably be less significant since these tools do not
systematically explore all interleavings.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how to securely compose a protocol with the implementation of its channels. We have
provided a characterization for the three most common types of channels: secure, confidential, and au-
thentic channels. We plan to consider other types of communication channels like anonymous channels.
This will certainly require to extend our approach to equivalence properties.
Our composition result holds for a class of primitives that encompasses all standard cryptographic
primitives. We plan to extend it to a larger class of primitives, including in particular exclusive or or
homomorphic encryption.
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Our result assumes a light tagging of the primitives, to ensure that an encapsulation cannot be confused
with a message coming from the protocols. While tagging is reasonable, it is not often done in practice.
On the other hand standard protocols typically enjoy some non unifiability properties that prevent such
confusion. We believe that our result could be extended to a general notion of non unifiability of the
terms, without having to require explicit tagging.
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A Modelization of other protocols
A.1 TLS and 3D secure
A.1.1 TLS
TLS is the protocol that is most often used when an application needs a secure channel to communicate on
a public network. In a TLS session between a clientC and a server S , C and S start by doing a handshake
: C sends a message containing a constant helloC along with his name, a session number id and a fresh
nonce nC . The server then answers a constant helloS along with the same session number id, another fresh
nonce nS and its signed public encryption key. After that, C runs the key exchange step by encrypting
with S ’s public key a message containing a randomly generated value pms along with the two previous
nonces nC and nS , S checks that nC and nS are in the message he received and if so C and S build the
session key keygen(pms, nS , nC). The two last steps consist in C and S sending each other respectively
the hashes f inishC and f inishS encrypted by keygen(pms, nS , nC) : they contain all the values that were
transmitted during the session, furthermore f inishC and f inishS contain respectively the labels client
and server so that they can not be confused. f inishC and f inishS enable C and S to check that they
agree upon what has been transmitted during the session. The session key keygen(pms, nS , nC) provided
by TLS will be used to implement the channels in other protocols
Here is diagram showing how a TLS session works with tTLS a tag:
C → S : 〈helloC, name[C], nC, id〉
S → C : 〈helloS, nS , id〉
S → C : sign(〈tTLS, name[S ], pk(priv[S ])〉, sk[S ])
C → S : aenc(〈tTLS, pms〉, pk(priv[S ]))
C → S : senc(〈tTLS, f inishC〉, keygen(pms, nC, nS ))
with f inishC = h(〈tTLS, keygen(pms, nC, nS ), name[C], name[S ], nC, nS , id, client〉)
S → C : senc(〈tTLS, f inishS 〉, keygen(pms, nC, nS ))
with f inishS = h(〈tTLS, keygen(pms, nC, nS ), name[C], name[S ], nC, nS , id, server〉)
In our models, the roles of the client (RC) and of the server (RS) are as follows, with c ∈ Chp :
RC = new nC.new id.outC(c, 〈helloC, name[C], nC, id〉).inC(c, 〈helloS, x, id〉).
inC(c, sign(〈tTLS, name[S ], u〉, sk[S ])).new pms.outC(c, aenc(〈tTLS, pms〉, u)).
outC(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishC1〉, keygen(pms, nC , x))).
inC(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishS 1〉, keygen(pms, nC, x))).0
RS = inS(c, 〈helloC, v,w, y〉).new nS .outS(c, 〈helloS, nS , y〉).
outS(c, sign(〈tTLS, name[S ], pk(priv[S ])〉, sk[S ])).
inS(c, aenc(〈tTLS, z〉, pk(priv[S ]))).inS(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishC2〉, keygen(z,w, nS ))).
outS(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishS 2〉, keygen(z,w, nS ))).0
where
f inishC1 = h(〈keygen(pms, nC, x), name[C], name[S ], nC, x, Id, client〉)
f inishS 1 = h(〈keygen(pms, nC, x), name[C], name[S ], nC, x, Id, server〉)
f inishC2 = h(〈keygen(z,w, nS ), v, name[C], name[S ],w, nS , y, client〉)
f inishS 2 = h(〈keygen(z,w, nS ), v, name[C], name[S ],w, nS , y, server〉)
The session key provided by TLS is keygen(z,w, nS ) for RS and keygen(pms, nC, x) for RC.
RR n° 8790
18 Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, Eric Le Morvan
A.1.2 3D secure
An informal description of a 3D-secure session between a client C, a merchant M, a directory server DS
and an access control server ACS is provided below.
C →sec M : 〈pan[C], expiry[C]〉
M →sec DS : 〈pan[C], password[M], in f oM〉
DS →sec ACS : 〈pan[C], in f oM〉
ACS →sec DS : 〈panok, acctid, url[ACS ], proto〉
DS →sec M : 〈panok, acctid, url[ACS ], proto〉
M →sec C : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, publicM, expiry[C], transIn f o〉, skVIS A[M])
C →sec ACS : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, publicM, expiry[C], transIn f o〉, skVIS A[M])
ACS →sec C : 〈name[M], payIn f o, panshort[C], expiry[C]〉
ACS →outo f band C : pam[C]
C →sec ACS : password[C]
ACS →sec C : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, xid, payIn f o, panshort[C], status, otherIn f o〉, skVIS A[ACS ])
C →sec M : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, xid, payIn f o, panshort[C], status, otherIn f o〉, skVIS A[ACS ])
M →sec C : sign(〈t3D, status〉, skVIS A[M])
where in f oM = 〈macqbin, id[M]〉, publicM = 〈name[M], url[M]〉, transIn f o = 〈xid, pdate, pamnt,
acctid〉, payIn f o = 〈pamnt, pdate〉 and otherIn f o = 〈date, cavv, eci, cavvalg〉. The specification of
the 3D-secure protocol is not public, the semantics of some of the data (e.g. cavv, eci, cavvalg) are
unspecified even in [16]. That is why in the protocol we model them as nonces.
A 3D-secure session starts when C sends to M a purchase request containing her primary account
number pan[C] and the expiration date expiry[C] of the card. Then M forwards to DS pan[C] along
with M’s identifiers in f oM and password[M] shared only by M and DS : M asks for confirmation
about C’s banking account. DS transmits to ACS the identifiers of M along with pan[C] so that ACS
certifies the existence of the bank account of C. Upon successful verification, ACS sends confirmation
panok to DS along with its own url url[ACS ] and some other information to be forwarded to M. M
then sends to C a signed copy of M’s own information in f oM and publicM along with the identifiers
transIn f o regarding the transaction, furthermore it makes C initiate a communication with ACS thanks
to his knowledge of url[ACS ]. C forwards M’s signed message to ACS so that ACS checks C. ACS
sends back to C a summary of the transaction (M’s identity, payIn f o and panshort[C]). ACS also sends
a personnal assurance message pam[C] at some point thatC uses to determine the password password[C]
that she has to give to authentify herself to ACS . The nature of pam[C] is not specified, usually it consists
in a secret code sent to C’s mobile phone that has to be sent back, or it can be a password matrix given to
C when she gets her credit card, in that case C just has to send the password contained in a case specified
by ACS . In the end, ACS gives C a signed message containing all the data necessary to conclude the
transaction. That certified message is then forwarded to M and finally M signs with his own signing key
the status of the transaction between C and M.
We notice that the signing key sk involved in TLS is different from the ones involved in 3D secure,
which models the fact that signing keys in 3D secure are provided by VISA that is in charge of credit
cards, thus that signing key has no reason to be involved in TLS. Consequently TLS and 3D secure do
not share names, which is a prerequisite of our result.
A.1.3 Composition between TLS and 3D secure
Channels in 3D secure have to be implemented between all the users that have to speak together, namely
C and M, M and DS , DS and ACS , ACS andC. Thus if 3D secure is to be composed with TLS, we need
to instanciate it with all the agents that will later share secure channels in 3D secure. However given that
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the CL-Atse tool can not analyse 4 TLS sessions within a reasonable time (24 hours), we had to restrict
the composition to only one channel implementation betweenC and M. Consequently we model the case
where there is only one honest Access Directory Server ACS , one honest Directory Server DS and one
honest merchant M speaking with an unbounded number of clients, possibly dishonest. The four roles
of 3D-secure are denoted by R′
C
, R′
M
, R′
DS
, and R′
ACS
. Thus 3D secure can be modeled by the following
process:
3D = C3D[new c
ca1
s .new c
ca2
s .new c
cm
s .new c
ma
s .new c
ad
s .(R
′
C | R
′
M | R
′
ACS | R
′
DS )]
where
C3D[_] = ag(M, {M},K
′M
pub,K
′M
prv).ag(ACS , {ACS }, ∅,K
′ACS
prv ).ag(DS , {DS }, ∅, ∅).!ag(C,P, ∅,K
′C
prv)._
with the sets K
′M
pub
= {id[M], name[M]}, K
′M
prv = {password[M], skVIS A[M], url[M]}, K
′C
prv = {pan[C],
expiry[C], pam[C], password[C]} and K
′ACS
prv = {skVIS A[ACS ], url[ACS ]}.
Since we implement only the secure channel betweenC andM, the complete representation of the sys-
tem is the process TLS = ag(M, {M},KM
pub
,KMprv).!ag(C,P,K
C
pub
, ∅).(RC | RS) where P is an infinite set of
agents containing honest and dishonest agents such thatM < P andKM
pub
= {pk(priv[M]), vk(sk[M]), name[M]},
KMprv = {priv[M], sk[M]}, K
C
pub
= {name[C]}.
As previously mentioned, the 3D-secure protocol specifies that all the exchanged messages should
be done on secure channels implemented by TLS, except the out of bound channel used by the issuer’s
Access Control Servers. More specifically, they require that all messages of the 3D secure protocol must
be encrypted with a symmetric session key previously established with TLS. In our model, it means
that the messages are encapsulated by (ETLS, ∅), as defined in Theorem 3.1. Moreover as explained in
Section 5, the session keys provided by TLS are keygen(z,w, nS ) and keygen(pms, nC, x) for the card
holder and merchant respectively. Therefore, by defining the mapping ρ = {ccm
S
→ ((C,M), (ETLS, ∅))},
an annotation of TLS under ρ is the following process:
˜TLS = CTLS [RC.eventC(ev(c
cm
s , (C,M), k
1
CM
)) | RS.eventM(ev(c
cm
s , (C,M), k
2
CM
))]
where CTLS [_] = ag(M, {M},K
M
pub
,KMprv).ag(C,P,K
C
pub
, ∅)._, k1
CM
= keygen(pms, nC, x)) and k
2
CM
=
keygen(z,w, nS )). Therefore, the implementation of 3D by ˜TLS through ρ is the process:
˜TLS ·ρ 3D = CCTLS ,C3D[(new c
ca1
S
.new c
ca2
S
.new cmaS .new c
ad
S .(RC.R
′
C) | (RS.R
′
M) | R
′
ACS | R
′
DS )]
where
CCTLS ,C3D [_] = ag(M, {M},KM
pub
∪ K
′M
pub
,KMprv ∪ K
′M
prv).ag(ACS , {ACS },K
′ACS
pub
,K
′ACS
prv ).
ag(DS , {DS }, ∅, ∅).!ag(C,P,KC
pub
,KCprv ∪ K
′C
prv)._
Our result now enables us to conclude that if
C3D[(new c
ca1
S
.new c
ca2
S
.new ccm
S
.new cma
S
.new cad
S
.
(R′
C
.eventC(Sec(pan[C], (C,M, ACS ,DS ))) | R
′
M
| R′
ACS
| R′
DS
))]
preserves secrecy (in that instance, the secrecy of pan[C]) and if ˜TLS is secure, then the implementation
of the process 3D by ˜TLS through ρ preserves secrecy. Furthermore we can also look at the secrecy of
other data such as pam[C] expressed as follows.
C3D[(new c
ca1
S
.new c
ca2
S
.new ccm
S
.new cma
S
.new cad
S
.
(R′
C
.eventC(Sec(pam[C], (C, ACS ))) | R
′
M
| R′
ACS
| R′
DS
))]
Note that the secrecy of pam[C] only concerns the agents C and ACS whereas the secrecy of pan[C] is
between C, M, ACS , DS . Our model allows us to verify the secrecy of pam[C] even when M or DS can
be dishonest.
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A.2 Active Authentication protocol
The aim of the Active Authentication protocol (AA) is to prevent cloning of the passport chip. For that
purpose the protocol relies on a signing key sk[P] that is registered in a tempered resistant memory and
cannot be read or copied. A certificate of the verification key vk(sk[P]) provided by the Document Signer
authority mentioned in Example 6 is in fact contained in the data of the passport. For sake of simplicity,
we represented these data in Example 6 as a name data[P] since their exact value was irrelevant for the
implementation of the Passive Authentication protocol by the Basic Access Control protocol. In reality,
the data stored in the chip is organized in data groups (dg1 up to dg19), some of them containing the
passport holder’s name, picture, etc. In particular, the certificate of the verification key vk(sk[P]), that is
sign(vk(sk[P]), sk[D]), is stored in the data group dg15. Thus, by replacing, in the Passive Authentication
presented in Example 6, the name data[P] by the tuple of data groups, we can see that a reader would
then be able to obtain from d15 the verification key vk(sk[P]) after the execution of the protocol.
A session of the Active Authentication protocol is as follows: R sends to P a nonce nR that P has to
send back along with a nonce nP after having them signed with sk[P]. In our study we consider the case
where AA is a-tagged, although it is not the case in practice.
R →sec P : 〈init, nR〉
P →sec R : sign(〈a, nP, nR〉, sk[P])
The AA roles of the reader (QR) and of the passport (QP) on cs ∈ Chs can be expressed as below in our
formalism :
QR = new nR.outR(cs, 〈init, nR〉).inR(cs, sign(〈a, x
′, nR〉, sk[P]))
QP = inP(cs, 〈init, y
′〉).new nP.outP(cs, sign(〈a, nP, y
′〉, sk[P]))
We model the case where one honnest reader speaks with an unbounded number of honest and dis-
honest passports. Thus AA can be modeled as a whole by AA = CAA[new cs.(QR | QP)] where
CAA = ag(D, {D}, vk(sk[D]), sk[D]).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {sk[P]})._
where P is an infinite set of agents containing honest and dishonest agents and R,D < P.
We study the composition between the Basic Access Control (BAC) and AA. As explained in the
section 2.3, in the a-tagged BAC protocol the role of the passport (RP) and the role of the reader (RR) can
be modeled as shown below, with c ∈ Chp, M = senc(〈a, x, nP, y〉, ke[P]), N = senc(〈a, nP, x, kP〉, ke[P]),
U = senc(〈a, nR, z, kR〉, ke[P]) and V = senc(〈a, z, nR,w〉, ke[P]) :
RP = inP(c, challenge).new nP.outP(c, nP).inP(c, 〈M,mac(〈a,M〉, km[P])〉).
new kP.outP(c, 〈N,mac(〈a,N〉, km[P])〉).0
RR = outR(c, challenge).inR(c, z).new kR.new nR.outR(c, 〈U,mac(〈a,U〉, km[P])).
inR(c, 〈V,mac(〈a,V〉, km[P])〉).0
Hence an honest reader communicating with an unbounded number of passports that are either honest or
dishonest can be modeled by :
BAC = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]}).(RP | RR)
As written in section 3.1, the BAC protocol is meant to generate two session keys per role (f1(y, kP)
and f2(y, kP) for RP, f1(kR,w) and f2(kR,w) for RR), and the messages sent in AA are all encapsulated
by (EBAC, ∅) where EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈aEBAC, t〉, x2)〉 with t = senc(〈aEBAC, x〉, x1), tEBAC = x and XEBAC =
(x1, x2). By theorem 3.1, the encapsulation (EBAC, ∅) implements secure channels.
The fact that BAC aims at establishing a secure channel for P and R is translated in our model by
using the mapping ρ = {cs → ((P,R), (EBAC, ∅))} and the associated annotation of BAC under ρ:
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˜BAC = CBAC[RP.eventP(ev(cs, (P,R), (f1(y, kP), f2(y, kP))))
| RR.eventR(ev(cs, (P,R), (f1(kR,w), f2(kR,w))))]
where CBAC[_] = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]})._ .
Hence the two contexts CBAC and CAA can be composed into the new context
CCAA ,CBAC = ag(D, {D}, vk(sk[D]), sk[D]).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P], sk[P]})._
And now we can write the process ˜BAC ·ρ PA = CCAA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P
| RR.Q
′
R
] where Q′
P
and Q′
R
are
defined as follows:
Q′
P
= inP(cpub,EBAC(〈init, y
′〉,K1,K2)).
new nP.outP(cpub,EBAC(sign(〈a, nP, y
′〉, sk[P]),K1,K2))
Q′
R
= new nR.outR(cpub,EBAC(〈init, nR〉,K
′
1
,K′
2
)).
inR(cpub,EBAC(sign(〈a, x
′, nP〉, sk[P]),K
′
1
,K′
2
))
with K1 = f1(y, kP), K2 = f2(y, kP), K
′
1
= f1(kR,w), K
′
2
= f2(kP,w).
Our result enables us for instance to conclude that if the annotation under ρ of the Basic Access
Control ˜BAC is secure and if the Active Authentication
CAA[new cs.(QR | QP.eventP(Sec(sk[P], (P))))]
preserves secrecy, then
CCAA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P.eventP(Sec(sk[P], (P))) | RR.Q
′
R]
also preserves secrecy.
B Secure encapsulations
For our proofs, we will need to discuss about the deduction proof of Φ ⊢ t. As such, we will denote
by Φ ⊢P t the deduction of Φ ⊢ t with an associated proof P. We write Φ ⊢i t when t is the i-th
element of Φ. We write Φ ⊢t t when t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst. When an inference rule ir is applied on premises
Φ ⊢P1 u1, . . . ,Φ ⊢Pn un to obtain the term u, we write Φ ⊢ir(P1,...,Pn) u. Note that given a proof P and a
frame Φ, there exists a unique t such that Φ ⊢P t.
Given as a proof P can be seen as a term, we write M(P) = (n,m) the pair of integer where n =
max{i ∈ st(P)∩N} if st(P)∩N , ∅ else n = 0; and m = |P| where |P| is the number of symbols in P. We
also consider the lexicographic order on pairs of integers. Given Φ and t, we say that a proof P of Φ ⊢ t is
minimal forM if for all P′, Φ ⊢P′ t impliesM(P) ≤ M(P
′). We also consider sometimes minimal proof
P for |P| instead ofM(P).
Lastly we say that a proof P is a successive sequence of applications of decomposition rule on the i-th
element of Φ when there exists n ∈ N such that P = irn(. . . ir1(i, P1, . . . , Pm) . . . , P
′
1
, . . . , P′m′) and each irk
is a decomposition rule for k = 1 . . .n.
We denote by st<(t) the set of strict subterms of t. We naturally extend this notion to frames.
Lemma 1 Let Φ be a frame. Let t ∈ T (F ,N ∪ X) such that Φ ⊢ t. For all P minimal proofs for |P| of
Φ ⊢ t, for all P′ ∈ st(P), for all terms t′, if Φ ⊢P′ t
′ then
• root(t′) < Fkey and root(P) is a composition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(t);
• root(t′) < Fkey and root(P) is a decomposition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ);
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• t′ = f(u) for some term u and f ∈ Fkey implies u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(t).
Proof We show the result by induction onM(P).
Base case |P| = 1: In such a case, t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. In the former, root(t) < Fkey and root(P) is
neither a composition rule nor a decomposition rule. Hence the result directly holds. In the latter, t ∈ Φ
and root(P) is neither a composition rule nor a decomposition rule. Therefore, if t = f(u) for some term u
and f ∈ Fkey then we directly have that u ∈ st<(Φ). Hence the result holds.
Induction case |P| > 1: Otherwise root(P) is an inference rule. Therefore, we have :
t1 . . . tn
t
with P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn) and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢Pk tk. Applying the inductive hypothesis we can
deduce that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all P′ ∈ st(Pk), for all t
′, if Φ ⊢P′ t
′ then :
• root(t′) < Fkey and root(Pk) is a composition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(tk);
• root(t′) < Fkey and root(Pk) is a decomposition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ);
• t′ = f(u) for some term u and f ∈ Fkey implies u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(tk).
Let P′ ∈ st(P) and let t′ be a term such that Φ ⊢P′ t
′. Let us do a case analysis on whether ir is a
decomposition or a composition rule.
• Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, there exists a function symbol f such that t = f(t1, . . . , tn),
implying that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, st(Φ)∪st(tk) ⊆ st(Φ)∪st(t) and st<(Φ)∪st<(tk) ⊆ st<(Φ)∪st<(t).
Hence, if P′ ∈ st(Pk) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} the result directly holds given our inductive hypothe-
sis. Consider now P′ = P and so t′ = t. In such a case, if root(t) < Fkey then we directly have that
t ∈ st(t) else t = f(u) with f ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(t). Therefore the result holds.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: Otherwise t1 = f(t, u1, . . . , um) for some term u1, . . . , um and f <
Fkey. Since P is minimal, we deduce that either root(P1) is a decomposition rule or P = t1 meaning
that t1 ∈ Φ (otherwise there would exist P
′
1
∈ st(P1) such that Φ ⊢P′
1
t and |P′
1
| < |P|). Let us
first focus on P′ ∈ st(P1). If root(t
′) < Fkey then by our inductive hypothesis and knowing that
ir is a decomposition rule, we obtain that t′ ∈ st(Φ). In particular when P′ = P1 we deduce that
f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ). Moreover, if t
′ = g(u) with g ∈ Fkey then u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)).
Since f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ), u ∈ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) implies u ∈ st<(Φ). Hence the result holds.
Note that f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ) allows us to directly prove that t ∈ st(Φ) hence the result holds in
the case P′ = P and t′ = t.
Let us now focus on the case where P′ ∈ st(Pk) for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. By our inductive hypoth-
esis, we know that root(t′) < Fkey implies t
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(tk). But from the definition of a decom-
position rule, we know that for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, either tk ∈ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) or root(tk) ∈ Fkey
and st<(tk) ⊆ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)). In the former, since f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ) then we directly de-
duce that t′ ∈ st(Φ). In the latter, since root(t′) < Fkey and root(tk) ∈ Fkey then t
′ ∈ st(tk) implies
t′ ∈ st<(tk) and so t
′ ∈ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) ⊆ st(Φ).
If t′ = g(u) with g ∈ Fkey then by our inductive hypothesis, u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(tk). But we have
already shown that st<(tk) ⊆ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) and f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ). Hence we deduce that
u ∈ st<(tk) implies that u ∈ st<(Φ) which allows us to conclude.
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B.1 BAC encapsulation
Lemma 2 Let aEBAC ∈ Tag. Let EBAC = 〈t, h(〈aEBAC, 〈t, z〉〉)〉 with t = senc(〈a, x〉, y), tEBAC = x and
XEBAC = (y, z). We have that (EBAC, ∅) is a {aEBAC}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(EBAC, ∅)} allows
secure channels.
Proof Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(EBAC, ∅)}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi and
XEi = (yi, zi). Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a ground
frame such that aEBAC < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We show that for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of Definition 3 hold.
Property 1: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ, ziσ}) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t. Assume that P is
minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEBAC < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t
and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that P′ = |Φ| + j.
Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that P
′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈
st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By Lemma 1, we deduce that either
t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t).
Since aEBAC < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming, we
deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact
have P′′ = ir(P′) where ir is one of the pair decomposition. Moreover, either t′′ = h(〈aEBAC, 〈u, ziσ〉〉)
where u = senc(〈aEBAC, xiσ〉, yiσ) or t
′′ = u. Once again since aEBAC < st(t), we deduce that P
′′
, P.
Thus, there exists Q = ir′(Q1, . . . ,Qℓ) and ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that Q ∈ st(P) and Qℓ′ = P
′′.
By the Lemma 1, we can easily show that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g < Fkey since if
would imply thatΦ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q Erσ for some r which would contradict our hypothesis on the minimality
of |P|. We also show that ir′ cannot be is a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey. In such a case, it would
imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q g(t
′′). But since aEBAC ∈ st(t
′′), then Q , P and so there must be another
inference rule ir′′ applied on Q in P. Once again, by Lemma 1, ir′′ cannot be a composition rule for any
function symbol since it would imply that g(t′′) ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) ∪ st(t) but EBAC does not contain
function symbol from Fkey and aEBAC < st(t, σ,Φ). Moreover, ir
′′ cannot be a decomposition rule either
since the only rule involving a function symbol g ∈ Fkey as argument is the signature decomposition
which would imply that there exists a term v and a proof R ∈ st(P) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R sign(v, t
′′).
Once again, this is prevented by Lemma 1. Therefore, we can conclude that ir′ cannot be a composition
rule for some g ∈ Fkey.
Thus, ir′ is a decomposition rule. Note that once again thanks to Lemma 1 and the fact that aEBAC <
st(t, σ,Φ), we can deduce that j′ = 1 meaning that t′′ is not used as a key in the decomposition rule
ir′. But there is no decomposition rule for h, thus t′′ = senc(〈a, x jσ〉, y jσ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q2 y jσ. This
allows us to deduce that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q 〈aEBAC, x jσ〉. But Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ 〈aEBAC, x jσ〉 also imply that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ x jσ and so j ∈ I. Therefore,Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aEBAC, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ|+ j then there exists
a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j u. Therefore,
by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This
allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei) r X and v ∈ st(E j) r X such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of EBAC, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of EBAC such that u = Ei|p and
v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ. We
do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for some
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k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEBAC < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ. Therefore,
Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ), we deduce that
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j, a
proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir1(ir2(|Φ| + j),Q j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aEBAC, x jσ〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j y jσ
where ir1 is the decomposition rule of senc and ir2 is the first decomposition rule of 〈 〉. Let us look at
the proof Q j. Since aEBAC < st(y jσ), we can deduce by minimality of |P| that |Φ| + j < Q j (otherwise,
using the same reasoning, it would imply that there exists a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) deducing yiσ). Thus,
Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j y jσ. Let I
′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j | Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I − j.
By applying Property 1 on y jσ with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ.
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ y jσ. Otherwise, if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also have proven that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ using the same replacement of proofs as in the proof of Property 1. Hence, the result
holds.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′ and
aEBAC < st(σ
′), if we denote J = I − i then. Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P
Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aEBAC < st(Φ). Therefore, there
exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 1, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). But
since aEBAC < st(Φ)∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the minimality
of |P|.
• Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1 u and
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 h(〈aEBAC, 〈u, ziσ
′〉) with u = senc(〈aEBAC, xiσ
′〉, yiσ
′). Let us first focus on P2.
If the last rule of P2 starts by a decomposition rule, then by Lemma 1, we deduce that h(〈aEBAC,
〈u, ziσ
′〉) ∈ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) whichwould then imply that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that h(〈aEBAC, 〈u, ziσ
′〉) =
h(〈aEBAC, 〈v, zkσ〉) with v = senc(〈aEBAC, xkσ〉, ykσ). Therefore, xkσ = xiσ
′ and so Eiσ
′ = Ekσ
which contradicts our hypothesis on the minimality of |P|. Therefore, the last rule of P2 is neces-
sarily a composition rule, implying thatΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ ziσ
′. Following the same proof of Property 1
(replacing t by ziσ
′), we deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ ziσ
′.
Let us now consider P1. If P1 starts by a decomposition rule, then by Lemma 1, we deduce that
senc(〈aEBAC, xiσ
′〉, yiσ
′) ∈ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). Thus, it implies that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
xiσ
′ = x jσ and yiσ
′ = y jσ meaning that XEiσ
′ ∩ XE jσ , ∅. Hence the result holds. If on the other
hand, P1 starts by a composition rule then we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′. Once again by
following the same proof as in Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ
′), we deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′.
B.2 TLS encapsulation
Lemma 3 Let aETLS ∈ Tag. Let ETLS = senc(〈aETLS, x〉, y), tETLS = x and XETLS = y. We have that
(ETLS, ∅) is a {aETLS}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(ETLS, ∅)} allows secure channels.
Proof Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. SinceS = {(ETLS, ∅)},
we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi and XEi = yi. Let
σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a ground frame such that
aETLS < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of Definition 3 hold.
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Property 1: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t. Assume that P is
minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aETLS < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t
and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that P′ = |Φ|+ j.
Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exists ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that P
′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈
st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By Lemma 1, we deduce that either
t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t).
Since aETLS < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming,
we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in
fact have P′′ = ir(P′,Q) where ir is the senc decomposition and t′′ = 〈aETLS, x jσ〉. Thus we have that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ x jσ and so j ∈ I. Therefore, Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aETLS, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ|+ j then there exists
a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j u. Therefore,
by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This
allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei) r X and v ∈ st(E j) r X such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of ETLS, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of ETLS such that u = Ei|p and
v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ. We
do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aETLS < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ. Therefore,
Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ), we deduce that
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j, a proof
Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir(|Φ| + j,Q j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aETLS, x jσ〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j y jσ where ir is
the decomposition rule of senc. Let us look at the proof Q j. Since aETLS < st(y jσ), we can deduce by
minimality of |P| that |Φ| + j < Q j (otherwise, using the same reasoning, it would imply that there exists
a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) deducing yiσ). Thus, Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j y jσ. Let I
′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j |
Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I − j. By applying Property 1 on y jσ with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and
I′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ.
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ yiσ. Otherwise, if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also have proven that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ using the same replacement of proofs as in the proof of Property 1. Hence, the result
holds.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ be some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′.
Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that
Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aETLS < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: by Lemma 1, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). But
since aETLS < st(Φ)∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the minimality
of |P|.
• Case ir is a composition rule: Then we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′. Once again by
following the same proof as in Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ
′), we deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′.
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B.3 Signcrypt encapsulation
Lemma 4 Let aEsigncrypt ∈ Tag. Let Esigncrypt = sign(〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x〉, pk(y))〉, z) with
tEsigncrypt = x and XEsigncrypt = (y, z). We have that (Esigncrypt, ∅) is a {aEsigncrypt}-tagged encapsulation and
S = {(Esigncrypt, ∅)} allows secure channels.
Proof Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(Esigncrypt, ∅)}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi
and XEi = (yi, zi). Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a
ground frame such that aEsigncrypt < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We
show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of Definition 3 hold.
We first prove that for all term t such that aEsigncrypt < st(t), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t implies Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume that P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or
t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEsigncrypt < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or
t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that P′ = |Φ| + j.
Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that P
′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈
st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By Lemma 1, we deduce that either
t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t).
Since aEsigncrypt < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming,
we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in
fact have P′′ = ir(P′,R) where ir the rule sign-decomp and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R vk(z jσ). Moreover, we have
t′′ = 〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉, pk(y jσ))〉. Once again since aEsigncrypt < st(t), we deduce that
P′′ , P. Thus, there exists Q = ir′(Q1, . . . ,Qℓ) and ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that Q ∈ st(P) and Qℓ′ = P
′′.
By the Lemma 1, we can easily show that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g < Fkey since if
would imply thatΦ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q Erσ for some r which would contradict our hypothesis on the minimality
of |P|. We also show that ir′ cannot be is a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey. In such a case, it would
imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q g(t
′′). But since aEsigncrypt ∈ st(t
′′), then Q , P and so there must be another
inference rule ir′′ applied on Q in P. Once again, by Lemma 1, ir′′ cannot be a composition rule for any
function symbol since it would imply that g(t′′) ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) ∪ st(t) but Esigncrypt only contain
the function symbol pk applied on y. But since aEsigncrypt < st(σ), we deduce that pk(yk)σ , g(t
′′) for all
k. Moreover, ir′′ cannot be a decomposition rule either since the only rule involving a function symbol
g ∈ Fkey as argument is the signature decomposition which would imply that there exists a term v and a
proof R ∈ st(P) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R sign(v, t
′′). Once again, this is prevented by Lemma 1 since
aEsigncrypt < st(σ). Therefore, we can conclude that ir
′ cannot be a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey.
Thus ir′ is a decomposition rule and in fact the second decomposition of the pairing implying that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉, pk(y jσ)). Using a similar reasoning as above, we can prove that
there exists R = ir′′(R1, . . . ,Rp) and p
′ ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that R ∈ st(P) and Rp′ = Q. Moreover, by
Lemma 1, ir′′ cannot be a f-composition for f < Fkey since the only function f possible would be the
pair but it would contradict our minimality hypothesis. Similarly as above, we can also prove that ir′
cannot be f-composition for f ∈ Fkey. Therefore, it remains that ir
′′ is a decomposition rule meaning that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R 〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉. But it also implies that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ x jσ meaning that j ∈ I and so
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ|+ j then there exists
a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j u. Therefore,
by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This
allows us to conclude.
Property 1: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ, ziσ}, we have that aEsigncrypt < st(t). Hence
we can apply the property we just proved which allows us to conclude.
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Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei) rX and v ∈ st(E j) rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉. By
definition of Esigncrypt, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of Esigncrypt such that u = Ei|p
and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ. We
do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEsigncrypt < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ. Therefore,
Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of the property we prove at the beginning of this
lemma, we deduce that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a
prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir1(ir2(ir3(|Φ| + j,Q j)),R j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉,
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j vk(z jσ) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R j y jσ where ir1 is the decomposition rule of aenc, ir2 is the
second decomposition rule of 〈 〉 and ir3 is the decomposition of sign. Let us look at the proofs Q j and
R j. Since aEBAC < st(y jσ, z jσ), we can deduce by minimality of |P| that |Φ| + j < Q j and |Φ| + j < R j
(otherwise, using the same reasoning, it would imply that there exists a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) (resp. R
′
j
)
deducing vk(z jσ) (resp. y jσ)). Thus, Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j vk(z jσ) and Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢R j y jσ. Let
I′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j | Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I − j. By applying Property 1 on y jσ
and vk(z jσ) with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ vk(z jσ).
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ yiσ which satisfies Property 4.
Otherwise, if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also
have proven that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ by the first property proven in this lemma.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such thatΦ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′. Consider
a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1
due to the fact that aEsigncrypt < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since
we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 1, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ)∪st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). But since
aEsigncrypt < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the minimality
of |P|.
• Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1
〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′))〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 ziσ
′. The latter already gives
us part of Property thanks to the first property of the lemma. Let us now focus on P1.
If the last rule of P1 starts by a decomposition rule, then by Lemma 1, we deduce that 〈aEsigncrypt,
aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′))〉 ∈ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) which would then imply that there exists k ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that xiσ
′ = xkσ and yiσ
′ = ykσ. Therefore the result holds. If the last rule of P2 is a
composition then we have P1 = ir
′(Q1,Q2) whereΦ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q2 aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′)).
If the last rule of Q2 is a composition rule then it would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ 〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉
and so Φ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′ which would allow us to conclude. If on the other hand the last rule of Q2
is a decomposition rule, then once again we would deduce that aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′)) ∈
st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) and so there would exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xiσ
′ = xkσ and yiσ
′ = ykσ. This
allows us to conclude.
B.4 Sign encapsulation
Lemma 5 Let aEsign ∈ Tag. Let Esign = sign(〈aEsign, x〉, y) with tEsigncrypt = x and XEsign = y. We have that
(Esign, vk(y)) is a {aEsign}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(Esign, vk(y))} allows authentic channels.
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Proof Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(Esigncrypt, vk(y))}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote
tEi = x and XE = yi. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be
a ground frame such that aEsigncrypt < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We
show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Definition 3 hold.
We first prove that for all term t such that aEsign < st(t), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t implies Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume that P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or
t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEsign < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪Fcst or t ∈ Φ.
Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that P′ = |Φ| + j.
Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that P
′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈
st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By Lemma 1, we deduce that either
t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t).
Since aEsign < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming,
we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Since ir is a decomposition rule, we
in fact have P′′ = ir(P′,R) where ir the rule sign-decomp and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R vk(y jσ). Moreover,
we have t′′ = 〈aEsign, x jσ〉. But it also implies that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ x jσ meaning that j ∈ I and so
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aEsign, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ|+ j then there exists
a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j u. Therefore,
by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This
allows us to conclude.
Property 1: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}, we have that aEsign < st(t). Hence we can
apply the property we just proved which allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei) rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉. By
definition of Esigncrypt, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of Esigncrypt such that u = Ei|p
and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 3: We directly have that {sign(〈aEsign, x〉, y), vk(y)} ⊢ x.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such thatΦ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′. Consider
a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1
due to the fact that aEsign < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we
already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 1, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). But
since aEsign < st(Φ)∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the minimality
of |P|.
• Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1
〈aEsign, xiσ
′〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 ziσ
′. Using the first property of the lemma, the result holds.
B.5 MAC encapsulation
Lemma 6 Let aEmac ∈ Tag. Let Emac = 〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, y〉)〉 with tEmac = x and XEmac = y. We have that
(Emac, ∅) is a {aEmac}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(Emac, ∅)} allows authentic channels.
Proof Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(Esigncrypt, vk(y))}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote
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tEi = x and XE = yi. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a
ground frame such that aEmac < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. In fact we
have I = {1, . . . , n}. We show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Definition 3 hold.
We first prove that for all term t such that aEmac < st(t), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t implies Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume that P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or
t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEmac < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪Fcst or t ∈ Φ.
Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that P′ = |Φ| + j.
Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that P
′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈
st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By Lemma 1, we deduce that either
t′′ ∈ st(Φ)∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(Φ)∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t). Since
aEmac < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming, we deduce
that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact have P′′ =
ir(P′) where ir is one of the decomposition of 〈 〉, and so either t′′ = x jσ or t
′′ = h(〈aEmac, x jσ, y jσ〉). If it
is the latter then since aEmac < st(t), we deduce that P , P
′′ meaning that there exists Q = ir′(Q1, . . . ,Qℓ)
and ℓ′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that Q ∈ st(P) and Qℓ′ = P
′′. But there is no decomposition rule for h therefore
ir′ is necessarily a composition rule.
By the Lemma 1, we can easily show that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g < Fkey since if
would imply thatΦ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q Erσ for some r which would contradict our hypothesis on the minimality
of |P|. We also show that ir′ cannot be is a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey. In such a case, it would
imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q g(t
′′). But since aEmac ∈ st(t
′′), then Q , P and so there must be another
inference rule ir′′ applied on Q in P. Once again, by Lemma 1, ir′′ cannot be a composition rule for any
function symbol since it would imply that g(t′′) ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) ∪ st(t) but Emac does not contain
function symbol from Fkey and aEmac < st(t, σ,Φ). Moreover, ir
′′ cannot be a decomposition rule either
since the only rule involving a function symbol g ∈ Fkey as argument is the signature decomposition
which would imply that there exists a term v and a proof R ∈ st(P) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R sign(v, t
′′).
Once again, this is prevented by Lemma 1. Therefore, we can conclude that ir′ cannot be a composition
rule for some g ∈ Fkey.
We just have proven that if t′′ = h(〈aEmac, x jσ, y jσ〉) then ir
′ cannot be a composition nor a decom-
position rule which is a contradiction. Hence t′′ = x jσ. Therefore, we have just shown that for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j and a proof Q j
such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
x jσ and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j xσ. Therefore, by replacing all instances of P|p′j in P
by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to conclude.
Property 1: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}, we have that aEsign < st(t). Hence we can
apply the property we just proved which allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei) rX and v ∈ st(E j) rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉. By
definition of Esigncrypt, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of Esigncrypt such that u = Ei|p
and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 3: We directly have that {〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, y〉)〉} ⊢ x.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such thatΦ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′. Consider
a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1
due to the fact that aEmac < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we
already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 1, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). But
since aEmac < st(Φ)∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the minimality
of |P|.
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• Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1 xiσ
′ and
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 h(〈aEmac, xiσ
′, yiσ
′〉). Let us focus on P2. Since aEmac < st(Φ, σ), we have that
P2 starts by either a decomposition rule or a composition rule. If it is the latter then we have that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ yσ′ and so the result would hold with the first property of the lemma. If it is the
former, then by Lemma 1, we would have that h(〈aEmac, xiσ
′, yiσ
′〉) ∈ st({Ekσ}
)
k=1
. It would imply
that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xkσ = xiσ
′ and ykσ = yiσ
′. Hence with the first property
of the lemma, the result holds.
B.6 Aenc encapsulation
Lemma 7 Let aEaenc ∈ Tag. Let ETLS = aenc(〈aEaenc, x〉, pk(y)), tEaenc = x and XEaenc = y. We have that
(Eaenc, pk(y)) is a {aEaenc}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(ETLS, pk(y))} allows confidential channels.
Proof Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. SinceS = {(ETLS, ∅)},
we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi and XEi = yi. Let
σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a ground frame such that
aEaenc < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Properties 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Definition 3 hold.
Property 1: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t. Assume that P is
minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aETLS < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t
and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that P′ = |Φ|+ j.
Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exists ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that P
′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈
st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By Lemma 1, we deduce that either
t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t).
Since aEaenc < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming,
we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Therefore ir is the decomposition rule of
aenc and we have Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ 〈aEaenc, x jσ〉. Thus Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ 〈x jσ and so j ∈ I. Hence,
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aETLS, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ|+ j then there exists
a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j u. Therefore,
by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This
allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei) r X and v ∈ st(E j) r X such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of Eaenc, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of ETLS such that u = Ei|p and
v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ. We
do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEaenc < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ. Therefore,
Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ), we deduce that
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j, a
proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir1(|Φ| + j,Q j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aETLS, x jσ〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j y jσ
where ir1 is the decomposition rule of aenc. Let us look at the proof Q j. Since aEaenc < st(y jσ),
we can deduce by minimality of |P| that |Φ| + j < Q j (otherwise, using the same reasoning, it would
imply that there exists a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) deducing yiσ). Thus, Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j y jσ. Let
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I′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j | Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I − j. By applying Property 1 on y jσ
with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ.
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ yiσ. Otherwise, if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also have proven that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ using the same replacement of proofs as in the proof of Property 1. Hence, the result
holds.
Property 5: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ be some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′
and aEaenc < st(σ
′). We focus first on the left implication of the equivalence. If Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′
and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ pk(yi)σ
′ then we directly have that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ Eiσ
′. But since for all k ∈ I,
Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n} ⊢ xkσ, we deduce that Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n} ⊢ Eiσ
′. Otherwise, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that Eiσ
′ = E jσ and so we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n} ⊢ Eiσ
′.
Let us now focus on the right implication of the equivalence. Consider a proof Pminimal for |P| such
thatΦ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aEaenc < st(Φ).
Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the
result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
• Case ir is a decomposition rule: by Lemma 1, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). But
since aEaenc < st(Φ)∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the minimality
of |P|.
• Case ir is a composition rule: Then we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′ and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢
pk(yiσ
′). Once again by following the same proof as in Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ
′), we deduce
that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′ and Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ pk(yiσ
′) and so the result holds.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Lemma 8 Let Se be a set of Tag-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure channels.
LetΦ be a ground frame andσ be a ground substitution such that Tag∩st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Let (E1,F1), . . . , (En,
Fn) ∈ Se. Assume that the variables in E1, . . . ,En are disjoint. Let I be the set of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. For all terms t, if Tag ∩ st(t) = ∅ and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t then Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Proof Consider (En+1,Fn+1) ∈ Se such that the variables of En+1 are disjoint from E1, . . . ,En. Take σ
′
the ground substitution such that tEn+1σ
′ = a ∈ ND and for all x ∈ XEn+1 , xσ
′ = t. Since Tag ∩ st(t) = ∅,
we deduce that Tag ∩ st(σσ′) = ∅. Moreover, we have t ∈ T (Fkey,XEn+1σσ
′).
We also that that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t implies that Φ · [Ekσσ
′]n
k=1
⊢ t which implies Φ · [Ekσσ
′]n+1
k=1
⊢ t.
On the other hand, since a ∈ ND and for all x ∈ XEn+1 , xσ
′ = t with Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t, we deduce that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ En+1σ
′. Hence for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ then Φ · [Ekσσ
′]n+1
k=1
⊢ tEiσ.
Thus by applying Property 1 of Definition 3, we deduce thatΦ · [tEkσσ
′]k∈I ⊢ t and so Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Lemma 9 Let Se be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure channels.
Let S′e be a set of tagB-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure channels. If tagA ∩
tagB = ∅ then Se ∪ S
′
e is a set of tagA ∪ tagB-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels.
Proof Let (E1,F1), . . . , (En,Fn) ∈ Se ∪ S
′
e. Assume that the variables in E1, . . . ,En are disjoint. Let
σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) = vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a ground frame such that
(tagA ∪ tagB) ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Let I be the set of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. Let us denote
by A = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | (Ei,Fi) ∈ Se} and B = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | (Ei,Fi) ∈ S
′
e}. Moreover, let us denote by
IA = I ∩ A and IB = I ∩ B. We first start proving the following property:
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Property 0: For all term t, if (tagA ∪ tagB) ∩ st(t) = ∅ and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t then Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ A. Let us denote Φ′ = Φ · [Ekσ]k∈B. We have Φ
′ · [Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ t. But
(tagA ∪ tagB) ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅ and so tagA ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Moreover, IA is the set of i ∈ A such that
Φ′ · [Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ tEiσ. Since Se be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels, we deduce by Lemma 8 that Φ′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA ⊢ t.
If now we denote Φ′′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈IA , we obtain that Φ
′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ t. Consider the set I
′
B
of i ∈ B
such that Φ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tEiσ. We show that I
′
B
= IB. If i ∈ IB then we know that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. By
applying onc again Lemma 8 on Φ′, A and IA, we deduce that Φ
′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA ⊢ tEiσ and so Φ
′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢
tEiσ meaning that i ∈ I
′
B
. If i ∈ I′
B
, we know that Φ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tEiσ and so Φ
′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA ⊢ tEiσ. But
for all j ∈ IA, Φ
′ · [Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ tE jσ. Hence we deduce that Φ
′ · [Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ tEiσ and so Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ.
This allows us to conclude that IB = I
′
B
. Thus, we can apply Lemma 8 on Φ′′, IB and t which allows us to
deduce that Φ′′ · [tEkσ]k∈IB ⊢ t and so we conclude that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Property 1: Direct application of Property 0.
Property 2: Let i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let u ∈ st(Ei)\X and let v ∈ st(Ei′ )\X such that u and v are unifiable
and root(u) , 〈 〉. Thus tagA ∩ tagB = ∅, we deduce that either i, i
′ ∈ A or i, i′ ∈ B. In such a case the
result directly holds by applying Property 2 of Definition 3 on either A or B.
Property 3: Direct from Definition 3.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. Assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ A. Let us
denote Φ′ = Φ · [Ekσ]k∈B. Thus by applying Property 4 of Definition 3 on Φ
′, σ, IA, we deduce that
Φ′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA−i ⊢ tEiσ or there exists x ∈ XEi such that Φ
′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA−i ⊢ xσ.
Let us Φ′′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈IA−i. Consider I
′
B
the set of j ∈ B such thatΦ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tE jσ. We know that
for all k ∈ IA− i, Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEkσ. Therefore, we deduce thatΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tE jσ and so I
′
B
⊆ IB. Hence
by applying Lemma 8 onΦ′′, I′
B
and xσ or tEiσ, we deduce thatΦ
′′·[tEkσ]k∈I′B ⊢ xσ orΦ
′′·[tEkσ]k∈I′B ⊢ tEiσ.
But considering that I′
B
⊆ IB, we deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xσ or Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ tEiσ. Hence the result
holds.
Property 5 and 6: Similar proof as Property 4, that is we assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ A, we apply Prop-
erty 5 (resp. 6) on the frame Φ′ = Φ · [Ekσ]k∈B and IA, and when we are in the case of Φ
′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA
deduces a term u, we use Lemma 8 on Φ′′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈IA , IB and u to obtain that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I deduce u.
The following encapsulations are:
authentic: Esign = sign(〈aEsign, x〉, x1) and Emac = 〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, x1〉)〉;
confidential: Eaenc = aenc(〈aEaenc, x〉, pk(x1));
secure: ETLS = senc(〈aETLS, x〉, x1), EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈aEBAC, t〉, x2)〉 with t = senc(〈aEBAC, x〉, x1), and
Esigncrypt = sign(〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x〉, pk(x1))〉, x2).
where aEsign, aEmac, aEaenc, aETLS, aEBAC, aEsigncrypt are constants.
Moreover, the set {(Esign, {vk(x1)}), (Emac, ∅), (Eaenc, {pk(x1)}), (ETLS, ∅), (EBAC, ∅), (Esigncrypt, ∅)} allows-
for authentic, confidential and secure channels.
Proof Lemmas 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 6 give us that the encapsulations individually allows secure, confiden-
tial, authentic channels. Thus the proof is concluded by successive applications of Lemma 9 since all the
encapsulations are tagged differently.
C Proofs of Theorem 4
C.1 Properties on the composed frame
We say that a term t is a tagA-term if t = f(〈a, t1〉, t2, . . . , tn) where a ∈ tagA for some t1, . . . , tn.
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Definition 9 Let S be a set of tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] be a frame. Let I ⊆
{1, . . . , n}. We say that Φ is an executed frame for S and I if:
• for all i ∈ I, ui = EiΣi for some ground substitutions Σi and some encapsulation (Ei,Fi) ∈ S; and
• for all i ∈ I (resp i < I), for all t ∈ vars(Ei)Σi (resp. t ∈ {ui}), for all positions p of t, if t|p is a
tagA-term then:
– either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that j < i, t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p′ ·a;
– or [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p.
Corollary 1 Let S be a set of tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] be an executed frame for
S and some set I. For all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, [u1; . . . ; uk] is an executed frame for S and I r {k + 1; . . . ; n}.
In the rest of the section, if Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] is an executed frame for S and I then for all i ∈ I, we
will always denote by EiΣi the term un as described in the above definition.
Lemma 10 Let S be a set tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame and I ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Assume
that Φ is an executed frame for S and I. We have that for all t ∈ T (F ,N), if Φ ⊢ t then for all positions
p of t, if t|p is a tagA-term then:
• either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j) r
st(Σ j) and Φ ⊢ t|p′ ·a;
• or Φ ⊢ t|p.
Proof Let us denote by P the minimal proof such that Φ ⊢P t. Let us denote Φ = [u1; . . . ; un]. We
prove this result by induction |P|.
Base case |P| = 1: In such a case, either t ∈ ND or there exists i < I such that t = ui or there exists
i ∈ I such that t = EiΣi. However, In the first case, the result trivially holds.
In the second case, by Definition 9, we know that for all positions p of t, if t|p is a tagA-term then:
• either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that j < i, t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p′ ·a which implies that Φ ⊢ t|p′ ·a
• or [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p which implies that Φ ⊢ t|p.
Therefore the result holds.
In the third case, for all positions p of EiΣi, we distinguish whether t|p ∈ st(EiΣi)r st(Σi) or not. In the
latter, it implies that t|p ∈ st(Σi) and so there exists t
′ ∈ vars(Ei)Σi and a position p
′ such that t′|p′ = t|p
and p′ is a suffix or p. Therefore, by Definition 9 (instantiating t and p of the definition by t′ and p′
respectively), we obtain that if t′|p′ is a tagA-term then:
• either p′ = p′′ · a · p′′′ for some position p′′, p′′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that j < i, t′|p′′ ·a, t
′|p′ ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p′ ·a. Since p
′ is a suffix of p then p = q · p′ for some q. And
so we obtain that p = (q · p′′) · a · p′′′, t|(q·p′′)·a, t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and Φ ⊢ t|p. Hence the result
holds.
• or [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p which implies that Φ ⊢ t|p.
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In the former case, that is t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j), the result directly holds since t = EiΣi and Φ ⊢ t.
Inductive step |P| > 1 and the last rule of P is a composition: In such a case, t = f(t1, . . . , tm) and for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢ ti. Therefore, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on all t1, . . . , tn which allows
us to conclude for all position p of t different from ε. However, in the case where p = ε, we know by
hypothesis that Φ ⊢ t and so the result trivially holds.
Inductive step |P| > 1 and the last rule of P is a decomposition: Since P is minimal, we know that
there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that t ∈ st(ui). Thus, we can apply the same reasoning as in the base case
|P| = 1. This allows us to conclude.
Definition 10 Let S be a set tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame and I ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Assume
thatΦ is an executed frame for S and I. Let σ be a substitution. We say that σ is an executed substitution
for Φ if for all t ∈ img(σ), for all positions p of t, if t|p is a tagA-term then:
• either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j) r
st(Σ j) and Φ ⊢ t|p′ ·a;
• or Φ ⊢ t|p.
C.2 Transformation on composition frame and encapsulations
Definition 11 Let δ be a mapping from terms to nonces. We define the application of δ on a term u,
denoted Apδ(u), as follows:
• if u ∈ dom(δ) then Apδ(u) = uδ;
• else if u ∈ N ∪ X then Apδ(u) = u;
• else u = f(u1, . . . , un) and Apδ(u) = f(Apδ(u1), . . . ,Apδ(un)) for some f, u1, . . . , un.
Definition 12 We say that δ is a tagA-mapping of a frame Φ when names(Φ) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, img(δ) ∈ ND
and dom(δ) ⊇ {t ∈ st(Φ) | t is a tagA-term}.
Lemma 11 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure channels.
Let (E, ℓ, S ) ∈ S. For all substitution Σ, for all tagA-mapping δ of [EΣ], for all position p of E, there
exists a context C[_] built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst (possibly just a hole) such that
• EΣ|p = C[u1, . . . , un];
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ui is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or ui ∈ vars(E)Σ or a term of the form f(v)
for some f ∈ Fkey and v ∈ XEΣ ∪ Fcst.
• Apδ(EΣ|p) = C[Apδ(u1), . . . ,Apδ(un)];
• EApδ(Σ)|p = C[v1, . . . , vn];
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, ui is (resp. not) a tagA-term implies vi is a tagA-term (resp. vi = Apδ(ui)).
Proof By Definition 2, we know that E is a fully tagA-term of T (F , {x, x1, . . . , xn}) such that for all
t ∈ st(E),
• if root(t) = f ∈ Fkey then t = f(y) with y ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ Fcst
• if t = f(t′, t1, . . . , tn) and there exists an inference rule ir(f(y, u1, . . . , un), v1, . . . , vm) → y then for all
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, v j = g(ui) implies that ti ∈ {x, x1, . . . , xℓ}.
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Let t, s1, . . . , sℓ be some terms. We prove the different properties by induction on H − |p| where H is the
maximal size of all positions in E.
Base case |p| > H: Such a case is impossible since H is the maximal size of all positions in E.
Inductive case |p| ≤ H: By Definition of a fully tagA-term, we know that either root(E|p) ∈ Fcst ∪
{x, x1, . . . , xn, 〈 〉} or E|p is a tagA-term. We do a case analysis. If root(E|p) ∈ Fcst then the result trivially
holds withC = E. If root(E|p) ∈ {x, x1, . . . , xn} then the result trivially holds withC = _. If root(E|p) = 〈 〉
then E|p = 〈E|p·1,E|p·2〉. It implies that Apδ(E|pΣ) = 〈Apδ(E|p·1Σ),Apδ(E|p·2Σ)〉 and that EApδ(Σ)|p =
〈M1,M2〉withM1 = EApδ(Σ)|p·1 andM2 = EApδ(Σ)|p·2. Therefore, we can apply our inductive hypothesis
on p · 1 and p · 2 which show the existence of a context C1 and C2 satisfying their respective properties.
We conclude with C = 〈C1,C2〉. Lastly, if E|p is a tagA-term, then E|p = f(〈a,E|p·1·2〉,E|p·2, . . . ,E|p·m) for
some a ∈ tagA and some integerm. Therefore, EApδ(Σ)|p is also a tagA-term. Hence the result holds with
C = _.
Lemma 12 Let (E,F) be a tagA-tagged encapsulation. Let Σ be a ground substitution. Let δ be a tagA-
mapping of [EΣ]. For all position p of E, if there exists a term t such that names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and
Apδ(t) = EApδ(Σ)|p then E|p does not contain tagA-tagged term and t = EΣ|p.
Proof We prove the result by a downward induction on |p|:
Base case E|p ∈ X: In such a case, we directly have that EApδ(Σ)|p = Apδ(E|pΣ) = Apδ(EΣ|p). Thus
t = EΣ|p since names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅. Moreover, E|p ∈ X implies E|p does not contain tagA-tagged term.
Inductive case root(E|p) = 〈〉: In such a case, E|p = 〈E1,E2〉. Thus Definition 11 and Apδ(t) =
EApδ(Σ)|p imply that there exists t1, t2 such that t = 〈t1, t2〉 and Apδ(ti) = EApδ(Σ)|p·i for i = 1, 2. There-
fore, by our inductive hypothesis, we deduce that for i = 1, 2, E|p·i does not contain tagA-tagged term and
ti = EΣ|p·i. Since root(E|p) = 〈〉, we can conclude that E|p does not contain tagA-tagged term and t = EΣ|p
Inductive case root(E|p) , 〈〉: Otherwise, since E is a fully tagA-tagged encapsulation, we deduce that
E|p = f(〈a,E1〉,E2, . . . ,En) for some a ∈ tagA and some f ∈ F . Thus Definition 11 andApδ(t) = EApδ(Σ)|p
imply that there exists t1, . . . , tn such that t = f(〈a, t1〉, t2, . . . , tn), Apδ(t1) = EApδ(Σ)|p·1·2 and for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, Apδ(ti) = EApδ(Σ)|p·i. By our inductive hypothesis, we deduce that t1 = EΣ|p·1·2 and for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, ti = EΣ|p·i. Thus we deduce that t = EΣ|p. But we know that δ is a tagA-mapping of [EΣ] and
EΣ|p is tagA-tagged term. Hence by Definition 11, Apδ(t) ∈ ND which contradicts t = f(〈a, t1〉, t2, . . . , tn).
Hence the case root(E|p) , 〈〉 is impossible.
We can now define how we transform an executed frame Φ through a tagA-mapping of Φ.
Definition 13 LetS be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure channels.
Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets such thatΦ is an executed frame for S and D∪N∪H.
Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. We define the transformation of Φ by δ, D,N and H, denoted Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ),
recursively on |Φ| as follows:
• if |Φ| = 0 then TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) is the empty frame
• if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| < D ∪ N ∪ H then TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ′) · [Apδ(u)]
• if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| ∈ D then TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = TrH,δ
D−|Φ|,N
(Φ′) · [Apδ(t
i)];
• if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| ∈ N then TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = TrH,δ
D,N−|Φ|
(Φ′).
• if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| ∈ H and (E|Φ|, ℓ|Φ|, S |Φ|) is an encapsulation allowing authentic channels
then TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H−|Φ|,δ
D,N
(Φ′) · [Apδ(t
i)];
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• else Φ = Φ′ · [u] and TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H−|Φ|,δ
D,N
(Φ′).
Lemma 13 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that I = D∪N∪H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume thatΦ is an executed frame
for S and I. We have that for all t ∈ dom(δ), if tδ ∈ names(Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)) ∪
⋃
i∈I names(Apδ(Σi)) then Φ ⊢ t.
Proof Let us denote Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = [v1; . . . ; vm]. Let t ∈ dom(δ) such that tδ ∈
names(TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ))∪
⋃
i∈I names(Apδ(Σi)). If tδ ∈ names(Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)) then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
tδ ∈ names(v j). Following Definition 13, we deduce that there exists j ≤ i such that i < N and:
• either i < D ∪ H, v j = Apδ(ui) and so t ∈ st(ui)
• or i ∈ D ∪ H, v j = Apδ(tEiΣi) and so t ∈ st(tEiΣi) ⊆ st(Σi).
If tδ ∈
⋃
i∈I names(Apδ(Σi)) then t ∈ st(Σi). Thus, we deduce that either t ∈
⋃
i<I st(ui) ∪
⋃
i∈I st(Σi).
Consider i < I (resp. i ∈ I) such that t ∈ st(ui) (resp. t ∈ st(Σi)). By Definition 9, since t is a tagA-term,
we deduce that either [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t or there exist t
′ ∈ st(ui) (resp. t
′ ∈ st(Σ)) and k < i such that
t ∈ st(t′) and t′, t ∈ st(EkΣk) r st(img(Σk)) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t
′.
In the former case, the result trivially holds. In the latter case, by Lemma 11, we know that t′ =
C[w1, . . . ,wn′] where C is a context built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and for all wr ∈ {1, . . . , n
′}, wr is either a tagA-
term from dom(δ) or wr ∈ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst, img(Σ)). But we know that tδ ∈ names(Apδ(ui)) (resp. tδ ∈
names(Apδ(Σi))) and t
′ ∈ st(ui) (resp. t
′ ∈ st(img(Σi))) and t ∈ st(t
′). Thus by Definition 11, we deduce
that there exists r ∈ {1, . . . , n′} such that wr = t. Since [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t
′ and C is built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst, we
deduce that [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t and so the result holds.
Given a set S ⊆ N, given i ∈ N, we denote by S |i the set { j ∈ S | j < i}.
C.3 Deducibility link between composed and abstract frame
Definition 14 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. We say that Φ is a well formed frame
for S, D, N and H if the following properties hold:
• Φ is an executed frame for S and D ∪ N ∪ H.
• for all i ∈ D, Φ ⊢ ti.
• for all i ∈ N, Φ 0 ti.
• for all i ∈ H, for all v ∈ XEiApδ(Σi), Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) 0 v
• for all i ∈ H, for all v ∈ FiΣi, Tr
H|i,δ
D|i,N|i
(Φ) ⊢ v.
Lemma 14 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a well formed
frame for S, D, N and H. Let A = {a ∈ img(δ) | u ∈ dom(δ), uδ = a,Φ ⊢ u}. For all t ∈ T (F ,N), if
Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ t and names(t) ∩ (img(δ) r A) = ∅ then:
• if there exists t′ ∈ T (F ,N) such that names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Apδ(t
′) = t then Φ ⊢ t′.
• if there exist i ∈ I, a position p of Ei such that t = EiApδ(Σi)|p then Φ ⊢ EiΣi|p.
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Proof Consider a minimal proof P of TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ t. Let us denoteΦ = [u1; . . . ; uN] and
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = [v1; . . . ; vM]. We prove the result by induction onM(P).
Base caseM(P) = (0, 1): In such a case, we have that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst. Assume first that t < img(δ). In
such a case, since names(Φ) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, it implies for all i ∈ I, for all position p of Ei, t , EiApδ(Σi).
On other hand, t ∈ ND ∪Fcst and t < img(δ) also imply that t = Apδ(t) and names(t)∩ img(δ) = ∅. Hence
Φ ⊢ t.
Assume now that t ∈ img(δ) then there exists t′ such that t = Apδ(t
′). Moreover, we know by
hypothesis that names(t) ∩ (img(δ) r A) = ∅ hence t ∈ A which allows us to deduce that Φ ⊢ t′. Lastly, if
there exists i ∈ I, a position p of Ei such that t = EiApδ(Σi) then by Lemma 12, we deduce that t
′ = EiΣi|p.
Hence the result holds since Φ ⊢ t′.
Base case M(P) = (i, 1): In such a case, we deduce that either t = vi or there exists k ∈ I such that
t = EkApδ(Σk).
Consider first the case t = EkApδ(Σk) and there exists j ∈ I and a position p of E j such that t =
E jApδ(Σ j)|p. Thus we have EkApδ(Σk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p. By Definition 2, we know that there exists C[_]
built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and terms u1, . . . , un such that E j|p = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either
ur ∈ T (Fkey,X) or ur is a tagA-tagged term. Moreover, with EkApδ(Σk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p, we deduce that
EkApδ(Σk) = C[u1Apδ(Σ j), . . . , unApδ(Σ j)]. For all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we do a case analysis on ur and on its
position q in C.
• Case ur ∈ T (Fkey,X) and q is a position of Ek different from variable: In such a case, we de-
duce that urApδ(Σ j) = Apδ(urΣ j) and so Apδ(urΣ j) = EkApδ(Σk)|q. But q being a position of
Ek implies, by Lemma 12, that urΣ j = EkΣk |q. Since C[_] built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst EkApδ(Σk) =
C[u1Apδ(Σ j), . . . , unApδ(Σ j)] and q is a position ofEk, we deduce that for all prefix q
′ of q, root(EkΣk |q′) =
〈 〉 and so [EkΣk] ⊢ EkΣk |q. Since EkΣk ∈ Φ and EkΣk |q = urΣ j, we deduce that Φ ⊢ urΣ j.
• Case ur ∈ T (Fkey,X) and q is not a position of Ek different from variable: Once again, we have
urApδ(Σ j) = Apδ(urΣ j). However, q not being a position of Ek implies that there exists y ∈ dom(Σk)
and a prefix q′ of q such that Apδ(yΣk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q′ and p ·q
′ is a position of E j. By Lemma 12,
we deduce that yΣk = E jΣ j|p·q′ . Similarly to the previous case, we deduce that all prefix q
′′ of q′,
root(EkΣk |q′′ ) = 〈 〉 and so [EkΣk] ⊢ yΣk = E jΣ j|p·q′ . But urΣ j is deducible from E jΣ j|p·q′ hence we
can conclude that Φ ⊢ urΣ j.
• Case ur is a tagA-tagged term and q is not a position of Ek different from variable: Since q is
not a position of Ek, then there exists y ∈ dom(Σk) and a prefix q
′ of q such that Apδ(yΣk) =
E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q′ . But by Lemma 12, it would imply that E j|p·q′ does not contain tagA-tagged term
which is a contradiction with ur being a tagA-tagged term. Therefore, this case is impossible.
• Case ur is a tagA-tagged term and q is a position of Ek different from variable: In such a case,
E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q = urApδ(Σ j) = EkApδ(Σk)|q implies that Ek |q is also a tagA-tagged term. By Prop-
erty 2 of Definition 3, we deduce that img(mgu(E j|p·q,Ek |q))) ⊆ X. Thus for all position q
′, if
E j|p·q·q′ ∈ X then Ek|q·q′ ∈ X and E j|p·q·q′Apδ(Σ j) = Ek |q·q′Apδ(Σk) which implies E j|p·q·q′Σ j =
Ek|q·q′Σk. Therefore, we deduce that E jΣ j|p·q = EkΣk |q. But EkΣk |q is deducible from EkΣk hence so
is urΣ j.
This allows us to conclude that Φ ⊢ E j|pΣ j.
Consider now the case t = EkApδ(Σk) and there exists t
′ such that names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and
Apδ(t
′) = t. By Lemma 12, we deduce that t′ = EkΣk and so we directly have that Φ ⊢ t
′.
Consider now the case t = vi and there exists j ∈ I, a position p of E j such that t = E jAp|(Σ j)p. By
Definition 13, we know that there exists t′ such that names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Apδ(t
′) = vi. Hence we
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have that E jΣ j|p = t
′. By showing thatΦ ⊢ t′, the result would thus yield. Therefore, we focus on proving
that Φ ⊢ t′ which coincides with the last case.
By Definition 13, we know that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i ≤ j and j < N and:
• either j < D ∪ H and t = Apδ(u j). In such a case, since names(u j, t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ then t
′ = u j.
Hence we directly have that Φ ⊢ t′.
• or j ∈ D and vi = Apδ(tE jΣ j). Since names(tE jΣ j, t
′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, we have that tE jΣ j = t. But by
hypothesis, we already know that Φ ⊢ tE jΣ j hence the result holds.
• or j ∈ H, (E j, ℓ j, S j) is an encapsulation allows authentic channels and vi = Apδ(tE jΣ j). Once
again, since names(tE jΣ j, t
′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, we deduce that tE jΣ j = t
′. Moreover, we know by
hypothesis the frame is well formed hence by Definition 14, we have that for all v ∈ F jApδ(Σ j),
Tr
H| j ,δ
D| j ,N| j
(Φ) ⊢ v. Following Definition 13, if we denote by P′ the proof of Tr
H| j ,δ
D| j ,N| j
(Φ) ⊢ v, we obtain
thatM(P′) < (i, 1). But by Definition 2, we know that each element of F j is of the form f(y) where
f ∈ Fkey and y ∈ X. Hence, we deduce that for all v
′ ∈ F jΣ j, there exists v ∈ F jApδ(Σ j) such that
Apδ(v
′) = v. Therefore it implies that for all v′ ∈ F jΣ j, Tr
H| j,δ
D| j,N|,
(Φ) ⊢P′ Apδ(v
′) withM(P′) < (i, 1).
By applying our inductive hypothesis, we deduce that for all v′ ∈ F jΣ j, Φ ⊢ v
′. Therefore, by
Property 3 of Definition 3, we deduce that Φ ⊢ tE jΣ j and so Φ ⊢ t
′.
Inductive case M(P) > (i, j): Assume first that the last rule of P is a composition rule. In such a
case, t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some terms t1, . . . , tn and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ tk. If
there exists t′ such that Apδ(t
′) = t then by Definition 11, we deduce that t == f(Apδ(t1), . . . ,Apδ(tr)) for
some t′
1
, . . . , t′r such that t
′ = f(t′
1
, . . . , t′r) and so for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Apδ(t
′
k
) = tk. Thus we can apply
our inductive hypothesis on all t′
1
, . . . , t′n and deduce that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ t
′
k
which allows us to
conclude that Φ ⊢ t′
On the other hand, if there exists ℓ ∈ I and a position p of Eℓ such that t = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p then either
Eℓ|p ∈ X or for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, tk = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p·k with p · k a position of Eℓ. In the former case, we
deduce that there exists x ∈ Σℓ such that t = Apδ(xΣℓ). Therefore, we apply the same reasoning as above.
In the latter case, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on all t1, . . . , tk and so we deduce that for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ |p·k which allows us to conclude.
Assume now that the last rule of P is a decomposition rule. Therefore, there exists x ∈ X, u′
1
, . . . , u′n, v
′
1
, . . . , v′m ∈
T (Fkey,X), a substitution σ and some proofs P
′, P1, . . . , Pk such that:
• t = xσ
• vars(v′
1
, . . . , v′m) ⊆ {u
′
1
, . . . , u′n}; and
• P = ir(P′, P1, . . . , Pm); and
• Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢P′ f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′n)σ and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢Pk
v′
k
σ.
Moreover, by minimality of P, we deduce that there exists i′ ≤ i such that f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ is subterm of
either vi′ or EℓApδ(Σℓ) for some ℓ ∈ I. We do case analysis on these two cases.
Case f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ ∈ st(vi′ ): By Definition 13, we know that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,N} such that
i′ ≤ k and k < N and:
• either k < D ∪ H and vi = Apδ(uk);
• or k ∈ D ∪ D and vi = Apδ(tEkΣk).
Inria
Secure refinements of communication channels 39
By Definition 11, it implies that there exists t′, t′′ subterm of Φ such that f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′n)σ = Apδ(t
′′) with
t′′ = f(t′,w1, . . . ,wℓ), Apδ(t
′) = t and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Apδ(wr) = u
′
rσ. However, since for all r ∈
{1, . . . , n}, u′r ∈ T (Fkey,X) then it implies that for all y ∈ dom(σ), there exists a term w such that Apδ(w) =
yσ. Let us define the substitution σ′ such that for all y ∈ dom(σ), yσ′ = w where Apδ(w) = yσ. Since
we also have that for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, v′
1
, . . . , v′r ∈ T (Fkey,X) then we deduce that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k},
Apδ(v
′
rσ
′) = v′rσ. By applying our inductive hypothesis on Apδ(t
′′) and Apδ(v
′
1
σ′), . . . ,Apδ(v
′
k
σ′), we
deduce that Φ ⊢ t′′ and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φ ⊢ v′rσ
′. Thus it allows us to apply the same decomposition
rule and conclude that Φ ⊢ t′.
Therefore, we have shown that there exists t′ such that names(t′)∩ img(δ) = ∅, Apδ(t
′) = t and Φ ⊢ t′.
Note that since names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, if there exists another t′′ such that names(t′′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and
Apδ(t
′′) = t, then t′′ = t′. Therefore the result holds. Moreover, if there exists r ∈ I and a position p of Er
such that ErApδ(Σr)|p = t then by Lemma 12, we deduce that ErΣr |p = t
′ and so Φ ⊢ ErΣr |p = t
′ which
allows us to conclude.
Case f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′n)σ ∈ st(EℓApδ(Σℓ)) for ℓ ∈ I: If there is no position p ofEℓ different from a variable
such that EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p = f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ then it implies that there exists x ∈ Σℓ such that f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ ∈
Apδ(xΣℓ). Thus, we can apply the same reasoning as in the case f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ ∈ st(vi′ ) which allows
us to conclude.
Let us consider the case where there exists a position p of Eℓ different from a variable such that
EcℓApδ(Σℓ)|p = f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ. We build a substitution σ′ as follows:
By Definition 2, we know that for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if v′r < X then for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vars(u′r′) =
vars(v′r) = {x} implies Ecℓ|p·(r′+1) ∈ X. Thus, we define in such a case xσ
′ such that u′r′σ
′ = Ecℓ|p·(r′+1)Σℓ.
It implies that u′rσ = Apδ(u
′
rσ
′) and v′rσ = Apδ(v
′
rσ
′).
Otherwise, if v′r ∈ X then either there exists r
′ such that u′r′ = v
′
r or u
′
r′ = g(v
′
r) for some g ∈ Fkey. In
the former, it implies that v′rσ = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p·(r′+1) where p · (r
′ + 1) is a position of Eℓ. Thus we define
u′r′σ
′ = EℓΣℓ|p·(r′+1). In the latter, by Definition 2, we deduce that there exists t
′ such that v′rσ = Apδ(t
′)
and so u′r′σ = Apδ(g(t
′)). By Lemma 12, we deduce thus that EℓΣℓ |p·(r′+1) = g(t
′) and we define v′rσ
′ = t′.
We can therefore apply our inductive hypothesis on EcℓApδ(Σℓ)|p, v
′
1
σ, . . . , v′mσ which allows us to
deduce that Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ |p = f(xσ
′, u′
1
σ′, . . . , u′nσ
′) and for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢ v′rσ
′. Thus we can apply
the same decomposition rule and obtain that Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ |p·1.
Let us conclude by verifying the two hypothesis: if there exists t′ such that Apδ(t
′) = t then by
Lemma 12, we deduce that t′ = EℓΣℓ|p·1 and so the result holds. If there exists ℓ
′ ∈ I and a position p′
of Eℓ′ such that t = Eℓ′Apδ(Σℓ′ )|p′ , then we obtain that Eℓ′Apδ(Σℓ′) = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p·1 with Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ|p·1.
Therefore, we can apply the same reasoning as in he base case M(P) = (i, 1) and t = EkApδ(Σk) =
E jApδ(Σ j)|p with Φ ⊢ EkΣk. This allows us to conclude.
Lemma 15 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a well formed
frame for S, D, N and H. Let I′ ⊆ I such that for all i ∈ I′, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ tEiApδ(Σi). For all
t ∈ T (F ,N), TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ t implies Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
Proof Let t ∈ T (F ,N) such that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ t. We prove the result by induction on
|I′|.
Base case |I′| = 0: Trivial.
Inductive case |I′| > 0: Let k ∈ I′, we do a case analysis on k.
• Case k ∈ D: By Definition 13, we know that tEkApδ(Σk) ∈ Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ). Thus, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢
t implies that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ t. By our inductive hypothesis on I
′
r {k}, we deduce
that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
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• Case k ∈ N: In such a case, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) implies Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢
tEkApδ(Σk). By Lemma 13, we know that for all names a ∈ img(δ) ∩ names(tEkApδ(Σk)), for all
term u, u ∈ dom(δ) and uδ = a implies Φ ⊢ u. Thus, if we denote A = {a ∈ img(δ) | u ∈
dom(δ), uδ = a,Φ ⊢ u}, we deduce that names(tEkApδ(Σk)) ∩ (img(δ) r A) = ∅. Therefore, by
Lemma 14, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) implies that Φ ⊢ tEkΣk. This is a contradiction
with the fact that Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H. Hence this case is impossible.
• Case k ∈ H and (Ek,Fk) allows authentic channels: This case is similar to the case k ∈ D since
tEkApδ(Σk) ∈ Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) by Definition 13.
• Case k ∈ H and (Ek,Fk) does not allow authentic channels: In such a case, (Ek,Fk) satisfies Prop-
erty 4 of Definition 3. Thus, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) implies that either Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ·
[tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) or there exists x ∈ XEk such that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢
xApδ(Σk). In the latter, by inductive hypothesis on Ir{k}, we would deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σk)
which is in contradiction with the fact that Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H. Hence
we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk). By applying our inductive hypothesis
on I′ r {k}, we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk). Thus, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ t implies that
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ·[tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ t. By our inductive hypothesis on I
′
r{k}, we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
Lemma 16 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a well formed frame
for S, D, N and H. Let us denote I = D ∪ N ∪ H. The following two properties hold:
• for all terms t, names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Φ ⊢ t imply Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t)
• for all i ∈ I, for all positions p of Ei, if Φ ⊢P Ei(t
i, si
1
, . . . , si
ℓi
)|p then the term EiApδ(Σi)|p is
deducible from the frame TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
Proof Let a term t such that names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Φ ⊢P t. Consider that P is minimal. We will
prove both properties by induction onM(P). In particular, for the second property, we will assume that
t = EiΣi|p for some i ∈ I and position p of Ei. Let us denote Φ = [w1; . . . ;wn].
Base case M(P) = (0, 1): In such a case, P = 0 and so t ∈ ND or t ∈ Fcst. Therefore, we deduce that
Apδ(t) = t and so Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Regarding the second property, if there exists i ∈ I and a position p
of Ei such that EiΣi|p = t then either Ei|p ∈ X ∪ Fcst. In such a case, we deduce that EiApδ(Σi)|p = t and
so the result holds since TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
Base caseM(P) = (i, 1): In such a case, P = i and so t = wi. We do a case analysis whether i ∈ I or not.
Case i < I: By Definition 13, we know that there exists j ≤ i such that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ j Apδ(t). Thus the
first property directly holds. Regarding the second property, assume that there exists j ∈ I and a position
p of E j such that t = E jΣ j|p. By Lemma 11, we know that E jΣ j = C[u1, . . . , um] where C[_] is a context
built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uk is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or uk ∈ vars(Ei)Σi or a
term of the form f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey and v ∈ XEiΣi ∪ Fcst. We know that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Hence, for
all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if uk is not a tagA-term of dom(δ), it implies that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(uk). If uk is a tagA-term
of dom(δ), we know by Definition 9 that there exists P′ such thatM(P′) < (i, 1) and Φ ⊢P′ uk. Moreover,
there exists a position p′ of E j such that uk = E jΣ j|p′ hence we can apply our inductive hypothesis on it
which means that by combining both results, the result holds.
Case i ∈ I: In such case, by Lemma 11, we know that EiΣi = C[u1, . . . , um] where C[_] is a context
built on {〈 〉}∪Fcst and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uk is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or ui ∈ vars(Ei)Σi or a term
of the form f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey and v ∈ XEiΣi ∪ Fcst. Since t = wi, it implies that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
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Φ ⊢ uk. But by Definition 3 and in particular by Property 1 using the empty frame, we can deduce that
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uk is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or uk ∈ {tEiΣi} ∪ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst, ∅). Moreover,
by Property 4 of Definition 3 and by Definition 14, we deduce that uk can only be either a tagA-term of
dom(δ) or uk ∈ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst, ∅) when i ∈ D or when (Ei,Fi) does not allow authentic channels.
Furthermore, if (Ei,Fi) is an encapsulation allowing authentic channels, we know that by Defini-
tion 13 that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEiApδ(Σi). Since by Lemma 11, we have Apδ(t) = C[Apδ(u1), . . . ,Apδ(um)] and
Apδ(u1) . . . ,Apδ(um) ∈ ND ∪ {tEiApδ(Σi)} ∪ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst, ∅), we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t).
Let us focus now on the second property. Assume that there exists j ∈ I and a position p of E j
such that t = E jΣ j|p. If E j|p ∈ X then we have that Apδ(t) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p. But we already proved that
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t) hence the result directly holds. If E j|p < X then in such a case, E jΣ j|p = EiΣi implies
that E j|p is unifiable with Ei. Let us consider the E j|p. We know by definition that E j|p = C
′[r1, . . . , rℓ]
where C′ is built on pair for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, rk ∈ T (Fkey,X) or rk is a tagA-term. In the former, since
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t), we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(rkΣ j). In the latter, if q is the position of rk in E j and
q is also a position of Ei different from a variable, then by Property 2 of Definition 2, we deduce that
E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q = EiApδ(Σi)|q. Therefore, we have that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ rkApδ(Σ j). Otherwise by
Definition 9, we know that there exists a proof Q such that M(Q) < (i, 1) and Φ ⊢Q rkΣ j. Thus we can
apply our inductive hypothesis on it which allows us to deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ rkApδ(Σ j).
And so the result holds.
Inductive caseM(P) = (i, j) with j > 1: Let us do a case analysis on the last rule of the proof.
Assume first that the last rule of the proof is an f-composition rule. Therefore, there exists t1, . . . , tm
and ir such that t = f(t1, . . . , tm), P = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢Pi ti. If t ∈ dom(δ) then
Apδ(t) ∈ ND and so we directly have Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Else t < dom(δ) and since for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
M(Pi) < M(P) then by inductive hypothesis on all the ti, we deduce that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢
Apδ(ti). Moreover, thanks to t < dom(δ), we know that Apδ(t) = f(Apδ(t1), . . . ,Apδ(tm)). Hence we deduce
that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Consider now that there exists r ∈ I and a position p of Er such that t = ErΣr.
If Er |p ∈ X then Apδ(t) = ErApδ(Σr)|p. Therefore, we directly have that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t) as previously
shown and so the result holds. If Er |p < X then we can apply our inductive hypothesis on all tk with
position p · k and so the result also holds.
Assume now that the last rule is an f-decomposition. Therefore, there exists x ∈ X, u1, . . . , um, v1,
. . . , vk ∈ T (Fkey,X), a substitution σ and some proofs P
′, P1, . . . , Pk such that:
• t = xσ
• vars(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆ {u1, . . . , um}; and
• P = ir(P′, P1, . . . , Pk); and
• Φ ⊢P′ f(x, u1, . . . , um)σ and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φ ⊢Pr vrσ.
Moreover, by minimality of P, we know that there exists i′ ≤ i such that P is a successive sequence of
applications of decomposition rules on wi′ . We do a case analysis on f(x, u1, . . . , um)σ and i
′.
Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ ∈ dom(δ) and i
′
< I: Since P is a successive sequence of applications of
decomposition rules on wi′ , we deduce that there exists a position p such that wi′ |p = f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ
and (i′, 1) ≤ M(P′) < (i, j). But by Definition 9, we know that either [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ wi′ |p or else
p = p′ ·a · p′′ such that [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ wi′ |p′ ·a. Moreover, P being a successive sequence of applications
of decomposition rules on wi′ implies that there exists P
′′ ∈ st(P) such that (i′, 1) ≤ M(P′′) and Φ ⊢P′′
wi′ |p′·a. Since we already know that [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ wi′ |p′·a then there is a contradiction with the fact that
P is minimal.
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Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ ∈ dom(δ), i
′ ∈ I and f(x, u1, . . . , unσ) ∈ st(Σi′ ): Similar to the previous case,
meaning that we obtain a contradiction with the fact that P is minimal.
Case t ∈ dom(δ) and either i′ < I or t ∈ st(Σi′ ): Similar to the previous case.
For the next cases, we need to look at different cases depending on the property we prove. Moreover,
we have to switch from one property to the other depending on the case.
Property 1 Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ < dom(δ): In such a case, we have Apδ(f(xσ, u1σ, . . . , unσ)) =
f(Apδ(xσ),Apδ(u1σ), . . . ,Apδ(umσ)). By our inductive hypothesis, we deduce Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ f(Apδ(xσ),
Apδ(u1σ), . . . ,Apδ(umσ)) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(viσ). But u1σ, . . . , umσ, v1σ, . . . ,
vkσ ∈ T (Fkey,X), hence we deduce that for all i, Apδ(uiσ) = uiApσ(σ) and Apδ(viσ) = viApσ(σ). This
allows us to deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(xσ).
Property 2 Case for all k ∈ I and all positions p of Ek, EkΣk |p , f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ : In such a case, we
deduce that i′ < I. However, we know that there exists k ∈ I and a position p of Ek such that EkΣk |p = t.
Therefore, by Lemma 11, we deduce that t = C[u′
1
, . . . , u′n′] such that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n
′}, either u′r is a
tagA-term or u
′
r ∈ vars(Ek)Σk or u
′
r is of the form f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey and some v ∈ XEkΣk ∪ Fcst. From
the previous case, we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t) and so for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n
′}, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(u
′
r).
But by Lemma 11, we know that EkApδ(Σk)|p = C[v
′
1
, . . . , v′n′ ] such that for all r ∈ r ∈ {1, . . . , n
′}, if
u′r is not a tagA-term then v
′
r = Apδ(u
′
r). Moreover, if u
′
r is a tagA-term then by Definition 9, we know
[w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ u
′
r. We also know that there exists a position p
′ of Ek such that EkΣk |p′ = u
′
r. Hence
we can apply our inductive hypothesis on u′r and obtain that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ EkApδ(Σk)|p′ . By
combining the two cases (u′r being a tagA-term or not), we deduce that the term EkApδ(Σk)|p is deducible
from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
Property 2 Case there exists k ∈ I and a position p of Ek such that EkΣk |p = f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ: We
can apply our inductive hypothesis on f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ which allows us to deduce that EkApδ(Σk)|p is
deducible from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I . We show that we can apply the same rule ir. Let us look at the
terms v1, . . . , vm′ and construct a new substitution σ
′. For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}, by Definition 2
• either vr = g(x) for some x ∈ X, g ∈ Fkey and for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if x ∈ vars(ur′) then
ur′σ ∈ vars(Ek)Σk ∪Fcst. Therefore, for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if x ∈ vars(ur′) then EkApδ(Σk)|p·(r′+1) =
Apδ(ur′σ). Therefore, we define xσ
′ = Apδ(xσ). Note that in such a case, Apδ(vrσ) = vrσ
′.
Moreover, since Φ ⊢Pr vrσ then by our inductive hypothesis, we have that Tr
δ,Φ
ID ,IH
(⊢)Apδ(vrσ) and
so Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ vrσ
′.
• or vr ∈ X and for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if vr ∈ vars(ur′) then ur′σ = vrσ. In such a case, we define
vrσ
′ = EkApδ(Σk)|p·(r′+1). Note that since Φ ⊢Pr vrσ, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on
vrσ and the position p · (r
′ + 1) which indicates that the term vrσ
′ is deducible from the frame
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
• or vr ∈ X and there exists r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n) such that vr ∈ vars(ur′) and ur′σ = g(v) with g ∈ Fkey and
v ∈ XEkΣk ∪ Fcst. In such a case, we define vrσ
′ = Apδ(v). Similarly to the first case, we deduce
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ vrσ
′.
This allows us to conclude that f(x, u1, . . . , um)σ
′ = EkApδ(Σk)|p and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ vrσ
′ for
all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}. Therefore, we conclude that EkApδ(Σk)|p·1 is deducible from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
Property 1 Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ ∈ dom(δ): Considering all the different cases we went through, it
implies that i′ ∈ I and there exists a position p of Ei′ such that Ei′Σi′ |p = t. Therefore, by Lemma 11,
we know that t = C[d1, . . . , dk] where C is a context built on {〈_〉} ∪ Fcst and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, dr
Inria
Secure refinements of communication channels 43
is either a tagA-term or dr ∈ vars(Ei′)Σi′ or dr = g(v) with g ∈ Fkey or v ∈ XEi′Σi′ ∪ Fcst. By applying
Property 2 on t, we deduce that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if dr is not a tagA-term then Apδ(dr) is deducible
from TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I . Let us consider the different cases:
• if dr ∈ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst,XEi′Σi′ ) then by Property 1 of Definition 3 and Lemma 15, we deduce that
Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr).
• if dr = tEi′Σi′ and i
′ ∈ N then this case is in fact impossible since Φ ⊢ t implies Φ ⊢ ti
′
which is a
contradiction with Definition 14.
• if dr = tEi′Σi′ and i
′ ∈ D or (Ei′ ,Fi′ ) is an encapsulation allowing authentic channels, then by
Definition 13, we know that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr)
• if dr = tEi′Σi′ and i
′ ∈ H and (Ei′ ,Fi′ ) is an not encapsulation allowing authentic channels, then by
Property 4 of Definition 3 and Lemma 15, either TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr) or there exists x ∈ XEi′ such that
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σi′). But the latter case contradicts our initial hypothesis given in Definition 14.
Therefore, we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr).
Lastly, for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if dr is a tagA-term then Apδ(dr) ∈ ND and so we trivially have that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢
dr. This allows us to conclude that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ C[Apδ(d1), . . . ,Apδ(dk)] and so Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t).
Lemma 17 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a well formed frame
for S, D, N and H. Let us denote I = D ∪ N ∪ H.
For all (E,F) ∈ S, for all substitution Σ, for all position p of E, if Φ ⊢ EΣ|p then there exists a context
C[_, . . . , _] and some terms u1, . . . , un such that EΣ|p = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ ui and
if q is position of ui in EΣ|p then p · q is a position of E and
• either E|p·q ∈ X;
• or E|p·q = f(x) with f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst;
• or E|p·q is a tagA-tagged term and there exists k ∈ I and a position q
′ of Ek such that Ek|q′ < X and
ui = EkΣk |q′ .
Proof Let us denoteΦ = [w1; . . . ;w|Φ|]. Consider the minimal proof P such thatΦ ⊢P EΣ|p. We prove
the result by induction onM(P).
Base case P = (0, 1): In such a case, EΣ|p ∈ ND ∪ Fcst. Thus it necessarily implies that E|p ∈ X. Hence
the result holds with C = _.
Inductive case P = (i, j) and the last rule of P is a decomposition: In such a case, we deduce that there
exists k ≤ i such that EΣ|p ∈ st(wk).
By Definition 2, we know that there exists a context C[_, . . . , _] built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and some terms
v1, . . . , vn such that E|p = C[v1, . . . , vn] and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either vi is a tagA-term or vi ∈ X or
vi = f(x) for some f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst. Therefore, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, thanks to the fact that
C[_, . . . , _] is built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst, we deduce that Φ ⊢ viΣ. If vi is a tagA-tagged term then we do a small
case analysis on k.
Case k ∈ I and there exists a position q′ of Ek such that Ek|
′
q < X and vi = EkΣk |q′ : Trivial
Case k < I or Ek |q′ ∈ X: In such a case, viΣ being a tagA-term implies thanks to Definition 9,
we deduce that either there exist k′ ∈ I and a position q′′ of Ek′ different from a variable such that
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viΣ = Ek′ |q′′Σk or [w1; . . . ;wk−1] ⊢ viΣ. In the former, the result directly holds. In the latter, we can apply
our inductive hypothesis on viΣ since k − 1 < i which allows us to deduce the existence of a context Ci
and terms ui
1
, . . . , uini satisfying the correct properties. In such a case, we can directly conclude with the
context C[C1, . . . ,Cn] where Ck = _ in the case where uk is not a tagA-tagged term else the context Ck
obtained through the inductive hypothesis.
Inductive case P = (i, j) with the last rule of P being a composition: In such a case, EΣ|p = f(t1, . . . , tn)
where for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ tk. If E|p ∈ X the result directly holds. Else for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p · k
is a position E. Therefore, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on tk and so we deduce the existence
of a context Ck and terms u
k
1
, . . . , ukmk satisfying the correct properties. In such a case, we can directly
conclude with the context f[C1, . . . ,Cn] and the terms u
1
1
, . . . , u1n1 , . . . , u
n
mn
.
Lemma 18 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets
such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let (E,F) ∈ S. Let Σ be a ground substitution. Let δ be a
tagA-mapping of Φ · [EΣ]. Assume that Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H.
If Φ ⊢ EΣ and (E,F) allows confidential channels then
• either there exists k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and EkΣk = EΣ;
• or Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
If Φ ⊢ EΣ; and for all i ∈ H, either XEiΣi = XEΣ or XEiΣi ∩ XEΣ = ∅; and (E,F) does not allow
confidential channels then
• if there exists k ∈ H such that XEkApδ(Σk) = XEApδ(Σ) then there exist k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and
EkΣk = EΣ;
• if for all k ∈ H, XEkApδ(Σk) ∩ XEApδ(Σ) = ∅ then Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
Proof W.l.o.g. consider that the variable of (E,F) are disjoint from the variables of (Ek,Fk) for all
k ∈ I. By Lemma 17, we know that there exists a context C[_, . . . , _] and some terms u1, . . . , un such that
EΣ = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ ui if p is position of ui in EΣ then p is a position of E
and
• either E|p ∈ X;
• or E|p = f(x) with f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst;
• or E|p is a tagA-tagged term and there exists k ∈ I and a position q of Ek such that Ek|q < X and
ui = EkΣk |q.
Let us first prove that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ EApδ(Σ). Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let us denote by p is
position of ui in EΣ. If E|p ∈ X then by Lemma 16, Φ ⊢ ui implies that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(E|pΣ) = E|pApδ(Σ).
Similarly, if E|p = f(x) with f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst then we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ E|pApδ(Σ).
Otherwise E|p is a tagA-tagged term and there exist k ∈ I and a position q of Ek such that Ek |q < X
and ui = EkΣk |q. But E|pΣ = Ek |qΣk implies that E|p and Ek|q are unifiable. Therefore, by Property 2 of
Definition 3, we deduce that img(mgu(Ek|q,E|p)) ⊆ X. Therefore, Ek|qΣk = E|pΣ implies Ek|qApδ(Σk) =
E|pApδ(Σ). But we know thatΦ ⊢ E|pΣ and so Φ ⊢ Ek |qΣk. Hence by Lemma 16, we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ·
[EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ Ek |qApδ(Σk). This allows us to deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ E|pApδ(Σ). This
allows us to conclude that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ EApδ(Σ).
By applying Property 5 of Definition 3 and Lemma 15, we deduce that if (E,F) allows confidential
channels then:
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• either there exists j ∈ I such that E j ∼ E and E jApδ(Σ j) = EApδ(Σ); If j ∈ H then the result holds.
Else j ∈ N ∪ D. But in both cases, tE jApδ(Σ j) ∈ Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ). Hence we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢
tEApδ(Σ).
• or Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ) which implies Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ)
This allows us to conclude when (E,F) allows confidential channels.
By applying Property 6 of Definition 3 and Lemma 15, we deduce that if (E,F) does not allow confi-
dential channels then:
• either there exists j ∈ I such that E j ∼ E and E jApδ(Σ j) = EApδ(Σ). Hence the result holds.
• or there exists x ∈ XE such that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σ) and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ). Hence the result holds
• or there exists j ∈ I, y ∈ XE∩XE j , x ∈ XE such that yΣ = yΣ j, tEApδ(Σ) = tE jApδ(Σ j) and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢
xApδ(Σ). But by hypothesis, we know that for all i ∈ H, either XEiΣi = XEΣ or XEiΣi ∩ XEΣ = ∅. In
such a case, by Definition 14 and since Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σ), we deduce that j < H. Therefore, by
definition of Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ), we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
C.4 From the composed protocol to the abstract protocol (New)
The events added to a process P when created an annotation P˜ under a mapping ρ (Definition 4) contain
sufficient information to express when P˜ is a secure channel establishment protocol (Definition 8). How-
ever, the channels in the events of P˜ are public since they are not restricted by any new operator. For the
proof of Theorem 4, we need to link these public channels with the abstract channels actually restricted
in the context of Q. Therefore, we consider below new events e˜v1, . . . , e˜vn, . . . of arity 5 in which the
last elements will be used to “store" the abstract channels actually restricted in the context of Q. Let us
denote E˜v = {e˜v1, . . . , e˜vn, . . .}. Considering these new events, we also define a notion of process secure
similar to Definition 8.
Definition 15 Let P be a closed process. We say that P is secure when for all (P, ∅, ∅,
)
=⇒ e1 · . . . · em(P
′,Φ′, µ′, θ′),
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ei = ev(c, ta, (s1, . . . , sℓ), (u1, . . . , uq), d) such that ev ∈ E˜v and all agents in ta
are honest then for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, Φ′ 0 sk and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, Φ
′ ⊢ uk. Moreover, for all
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if e j = ev
′(c′, ta′, (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
), (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′), d
′) for some channel c′, d′, some tuple ta′ of
agents and some tuples (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′) of terms then
• either ta , ta′ or c , c′ or ev = ev′ implies ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
• or one of the two following properties is satisfied :
– (s1, . . . , sℓ) = (s
′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u1, . . . , uq) = (u
′
1
, . . . , u′q′).
– ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
.
Note that the definition is almost identical of Definition 8. The only difference is that we consider
events from E˜v instead of the events {ev1, . . . , evn, . . .}.
We also define a property on the trace linking the two channels of the events from E˜v.
Definition 16 Let P be a closed process. We say that an execution (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
e1·...·em
====⇒ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′) is
well formed if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ei = ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d), e j = ev
′(c, ta, ts, tp, d′), ev, ev′ ∈ E˜v, the
agents of ta are honest, ev , ev′ and d , d′ for some c, ta, ts, tp, d, d′, ev, ev′ then
• either there exists i′ < i such that ei′ = ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d
′′) for some d′′ , d;
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• or there exists j′ < j such that e j′ = ev
′(c, tq, ts, tp, d′′) for some d′′ , d′.
Lemma 19 Let S be a set of channels. Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] be a closed process such that:
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if c ∈ S appears in Ri then it can only be inside an unique event e˜vi(d, ta, ts, tp, c)
for some d, ta, ts, tp where A ∈ ta, A is the agent of Ri and newta c is in C.
• there exists a bijective mapping γ from S to fresh channels for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all e˜vi(d, ta, ts, tp, c)
in Ri, cγ = d.
For all (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒ (Q,Φ, µ, θ), there exists Q′, θ′, tr′ such that (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr′
=⇒ (Q′,Φ, µ, θ′) and this
configuration is well formed.
Proof Consider (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
e1·...·en
====⇒ (Q,Φ, µ, θ). Since the channels of S only appear in the events of
P, the choices of channels during the execution of the rule New-c do not affect the execution of the trace
other than the value of the channels in e1 · . . . · en. Let us create a partition ⊎
m
j=1
I j of {1, . . . , n} such that
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all k, k′ ∈ I j, the fifth argument of e
′
k
and e′
k′
have been instantiated by the same
execution of the rule New-c, for all k ∈ I j for all k ∈ I j′ with j , j
′, the fifth argument of e′
k
and e′
k′
have
been instantiated by two different execution of the rule New-c. This allows us to build recursively θ′ on
the m, i.e. on the order of execution of the rule New-c. Typically, when two events (evi(d, ta, ts, tp, c) and
ev j(d
′, ta′, ts′, tp′, c′)) of the same partition, meaning i , j satisfy ta = ta′ and d = d′ then we select the
same channels if (ts, tp) = (ts′, tp′).
Let us denote by Tt the set of tuples of terms.
Definition 17 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. We say that P is an initial process when for all
instances outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) in P,
• either u is a fully tagB-tagged term;
• or c = cpub and u = EΣ for some fully tagB-tagged substitution Σ and some encapsulation (E,F) ∈
S.
Let us denote by channelsO/I(P) the set of channels appearing in an output or input of P. Note that
channels(P)r channelsO/I(P) is not necessary empty since a channel c can be declared by new c in P but
never used in an output or input.
Definition 18 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be an executed ground frame for S and some
I. Let P be an initial process. Let α be a mapping from S × Tt to Ch. We say that α is a mapping of
channels for P (resp. Φ) when img(α) ∩ channelsO/I(P) = ∅ and for all (E,F) ∈ S, for all substitution
Σ, if EΣ is in P (resp. for all i ∈ I, if EΣ = EiΣi) then there exists c ∈ Ch such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α = c
and if (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels then c ∈ Cha ∪ Chp (resp. Chc ∪ Chp,
Chs ∪ Chp).
We define the transformed process of P w.r.t. α, denoted Trα(P), as the process P where we replace:
• all instances outAi (cpub,EΣ) by outAi (c, tEΣ)
• all instances inAi (cpub,EΣ) by inAi (c, tEΣ)
when ((E,F),XEΣ)α = c for some Σ and F.
Definition 19 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be an ground executed frame for some set I.
Let P be an initial process. Let α (resp. β) be a mapping of channels for P (resp. Φ). Let σ a substitution
of closed terms. Let tr be a sequence of closed events. We say that P,Φ, α, β, tr and σ have conforming
events if
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1. for all i ∈ I, there exist c, d, ta, k such that ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β = d, e˜vk(c, ta,XEiΣi,FiΣi, d) ∈ tr and
d < Chp is equivalent to all agents in ta are honest; and
2. for all roles R = r1. . . . .rn of P, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if ri = outA(cpub,EΣ) (resp. ri = inA(cpub,EΣ))
for some agent A, some substitution Σ and some encapsulation (E,F) ∈ S then there exists c, d, ta
such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α = d and:
• either there exist j < i and ev ∈ E˜v such that r j = eventA(ev(c, ta,XEΣ,FΣ), d);
• or ev(c, ta,XEΣσ,FΣσ, d) ∈ tr and d < Chp is equivalent to all agents in ta are honest.
When tr and Φ are the empty sequence and σ is the identity, we say that P, α have conforming events.
Definition 20 Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a well formed frame for S and some D,N
and H. Let β be a mapping of channels for Φ. We define µ(Φ, β) as a mapping from channels to sets of
terms such that:
• dom(µ(Φ, β)) = {c < Chp | i ∈ H ∧ ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β = c}; and
• ∀c ∈ dom(µ(Φ, β)), cµ(Φ, β) = {Apδ(tEiΣi) | i ∈ H ∧ ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β = c}.
Lemma 20 Let S be a set of tagA-tagged encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels. Let P0 be a closed initial process. Let α0 be a mapping of channels for P0. Assume that
P0,α0 have conforming events. Assume that (Trα(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅) is secure. For all well-formed execution
(P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ, θ), there exists an initial process Q, a mapping of channels α (resp. β) for Q
(resp. Φ), and η, δ, D, N and H such that:
• Qσ = P; and
• ησ = µ and η only contains fully tagB-terms; and
• Q, Φ, α, β, tr and σ have conforming events; and
• Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H; and
• σ is an executed substitution for Φ; and
• δ is a tagA-mapping of Φ and σ; and
• (Trα(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅)
Apδ(tr)
====⇒Apδ(σ) (Trα(Q)Apδ(σ),Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ), ηApδ(σ) ◦ µ(Φ, β), θ)
Proof We do the proof by induction on the size of the trace (P0, ∅, id)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ):
Base case: The result trivially holds with Q = P0, α = α0, β = id, δ = id, D = N = H = ∅.
Inductive step: In such case, we assume that there exist two processes P1 and P2, two substitutionsσ1, σ2,
two frames Φ1,Φ2 and two mapping µ1, µ2 such that (P0, ∅, id)
tr1
=⇒σ1 (P1,Φ1, µ1)
e
−→σ2 (P2,Φ2, µ2). By
applying our inductive hypothesis on (P0, ∅, id)
tr1
=⇒σ1 (P1,Φ1, µ1), we deduce that there exist an initial
process Q1, a mapping of channels α1 (resp. β1) for Q1 (resp. Φ1), and η1, δ1, D1, N1, H1 such that:
• Q1σ1 = P1; and
• η1σ1 = µ1 and η1 only contains fully tagB-terms; and
• Q1, Φ1, α1, β1, tr1 and σ1 have conforming events; and
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• Φ1 is a well formed frame for S, D1, N1 and H1; and
• σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1; and
• δ1 is a tagA-mapping of Φ1 and σ1; and
• (Trα(P0), ∅, id)
Apδ1
(tr1)
=====⇒σ′
1
(Trα1 (Q1)σ
′
1
,Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1σ
′
1
◦ µ(Φ1, β1)) with σ
′
1
= Apδ1(σ1).
We show the existence of an initial process Q2, a mapping of channels α2 (resp. β2) for Q2 (resp. Φ2),
and η2, δ2, D2, N2 and H2 satisfying the result with (P2,Φ2, µ2) by case analysis on the rule applying in
(P1,Φ1, µ1)
e
−→σ2 (P2,Φ2, µ2).
Rule Out: In such a case, Q1 = Q | outA(c, u).RA, P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1, σ2 = σ1, Φ2 = Φ1 · [uσ1]
if c ∈ Chp ∪ Cha else Φ2 = Φ1, and µ2 = rect(c, uσ1, µ1) if c < Chp else µ2 = µ1. Let us first define
Q2 = Q | RA. This allows us to deduce that Q2σ2 = P2. Let us also define tr2 = tr1 and α2 = α1.
Therefore, we deduce that Trα2 (Q2) = Trα1 (Q1) | Trα1 (RA).
By Definition 17, we know that either u is a fully tagB-tagged term and c < img(α1) ∪ img(β1) or
u = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp where Σ is a fully tagB-tagged substitution and (E,F) is an encapsulation. We
do a case analysis:
Case u is a tagB-tagged term and c < img(α1) ∪ img(β1): In such a case, Trα1 (Q1) = Trα1(Q) |
outA(c, u).Trα1(RA). Since u is a tagB-tagged term, we deduce that Apδ1(uσ1) = uApδ1 (σ1) thus if µ2 =
rect(c, uσ1, µ1) (when c < Chp) then we can define η2 = rect(c, u, η1) and obtain that µ2 = η2σ1 = η2σ2
and η2Apδ2(σ2) = rect(c, uApδ1(σ1), η1Apδ1(σ1)).
Consider N2 and D2 such that N2 ∪D2 = N1 ∪D1 and such that for all i ∈ N2 (resp. D2), Φ2 0 t
i (resp.
Φ2 ⊢ t
i). Consider H2 = H1, δ2 = δ1 and β2 = β1. In such a case, if Φ2 = Φ1 · [uσ1] (when c ∈ Chp ∪Cha)
then we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) = Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [Apδ1(uσ1)] = Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [uApδ1(σ1)]. This allows
us to deduce that µ(Φ2, β2) = µ(Φ1, β1) and so:
(Trα1(Q1)Apδ1(σ1),Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1))
→
(Trα2(Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2), η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2))
Moreover, since σ2 = σ1, tr1 = tr2, α2 = α2, β2 = β1, all outputs and inputs of P2 are in P1 and N2 ∪
D2 ∪H2 = N1 ∪D1 ∪H1, we deduce that P2,Φ2, α2, β2, tr2 and σ2 have conforming events. Furthermore,
we know that σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1 and u is a tagB-tagged term. Hence for all subterms of
uσ1 that are tagA-tagged term, they are subterm of img(σ1). Hence following Definitions 10 and 14, we
deduce that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S, D2, N2 and H2. We also directly have that σ2 is an executed
substitution for Φ2 since Φ1 is included in Φ2. Lastly, since δ1 is a tagA-mapping of Φ1 and σ1 then we
know that all tagA-tagged terms in img(σ1) are in dom(δ1), thus so do the one in uσ1. Hence we deduce
that δ2 is a tagA-mapping of Φ2 and σ2. This allows us to conclude.
Case u = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp: In this case, by Definition 19, we deduce that there exists a channel
d such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = d. Let us show that if ((E,F),XEΣσ1)β1 = d
′ for some channel d′ and either
d < Chp or d
′
< Chp then d = d
′. By definition 18, we know that there exists i ∈ H1 ∪ N1 ∪ D1 such that
(Ei,Fi) = (E,F), XEiΣiσ1 = XEΣσ1 and ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β1 = d
′. Therefore, by Definition 19, we know
that there exists ev′ ∈ E˜v, c′
0
and ta′ such that ev′(c′
0
, ta′,XEiΣiσ1,FiΣiσ1, d
′) ∈ tr1 and all agents in ta
′
are honest is equivalent to d′ < Chp. Moreover, with the same definition, we also know that there exists
ev ∈ E˜v, c0 and ta such that ev(c0, ta,XEΣσ1,FΣσ1, d) ∈ tr1 and all agents in ta are honest is equivalent to
d < Chp. But we know that (Trα(P0), ∅, id) is secure. Hence by our inductive hypothesis on (Trα(P0), ∅, id),
if either d < Chp or d
′
< Chp then we deduce that all the agents in either ta or ta
′ are honest and thus
since XEiΣiσ1 = XEΣσ1 we obtain by Definition 15 that ta = t
′
a, c0 = c
′
0
and ev , ev′. But we also know
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that the execution (P0, ∅, id)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ) is well formed. Hence by Definition 16, we deduce that d = d
′.
So XEiΣiσ1 = XEΣσ1 implies that d = d
′. Therefore, let us define β2 = β1 ◦ {((E,F),XEΣσ1) → d} if
d < Chp or if ((E,F),XEΣσ1) < dom(β1). Otherwise, we define β2 = β1.
Moreover, u = EΣ and c ∈ Chp imply Trα1 (Q1) = Trα1 (Q) | outA(d, tEΣ).Trα1 (RA), Φ2 = Φ1 · [uσ1] and
µ2 = µ1. Therefore, by defining η2 = η1, we have that:
(Trα1 (Q1)Apδ1(σ1),Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1))
→
(Trα2(Q2)Apδ2 (σ2),Φ
′
2
, µ′
2
)
where Φ′
2
= Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [tEΣApδ1(σ1)] if d ∈ Chp ∪ Cha, else Φ
′
2
= Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1); and where µ
′
2
=
rect(d, tEΣApδ1(σ1), η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1)) if d < Chp else µ
′
2
= η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ1, α1). Note that tEΣ
is a tagB-tagged term hence tEΣApδ1(σ1) = Apδ1(tEΣσ1). Moreover, we also directly have that σ2 is
an executed substitution for Φ2 since σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1 and Φ1 is included in Φ2.
Furthermore, we know that Σ is a fully tagB-tagged substitution. Hence for all subterms of Σσ1 that are
tagA-tagged term, they are subterm of img(σ1). Hence following Definitions 10 and 9, we deduce that
Φ2 is an executed frame for S and D1 ∪ N1 ∪ H1 ∪ {|Φ1| + 1}. Note that by construction of β2 and by
Definition 19, we also deduce that P2, Φ2, α2, β2, tr2 and σ2 have conforming events. We do a small case
analysis on d:
• Case d ∈ Chp: In such a case, we define H2 = H1 and D2, N2 such that D2∪N2 = D1∪N1∪{|Φ1|+1}
and for all i ∈ N2 (resp. D2), Φ2 0 tEiΣi (resp. Φ2 ⊢ tEiΣi). Since δ1 = δ2 and σ1 = σ2 then by
Definition 13, we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) = Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [Apδ2(tEΣσ2)] = Φ
′
2
. Moreover, since
d ∈ Chp then by Definition 20, we deduce that µ(Φ2, β2) = µ(Φ1, β1). Hence we can conclude that
µ′
2
= η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2). Lastly, since H2 = H1 and we already proved that Φ2 is an executed
frame for S and D2 ∪ N2 ∪ H2, we deduce that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S, D2, N2 and H2.
This allows us to conclude.
• Case d < Chp: In such a case, we define H2 = H1∪{|Φ1|+1} and D2, N2 such that D2∪N2 = D1∪N1
and for all i ∈ N2 (resp. D2), Φ2 0 tEiΣi (resp. Φ2 ⊢ tEiΣi). By Definition 17, we know that (E,F)
allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels implies d ∈ Cha (resp. Chc, Chs). Therefore,
since δ1 = δ2 and σ1 = σ2 then by Definition 13, we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) = Φ
′
2
. Let us now
focus on µ′
2
. We know that µ′
2
= rect(d, tApδ1(σ1), η2Apσ2(σ2)◦µ(Φ1, α1)). But if d < dom(µ1) then
we need to look at µ(Φ1, α1). Since we defined β2 = β1◦{((E,F),XEΣσ1) → d}, Φ2 = Φ ·[EΣσ] and
H2 = H1 ∪ {|Φ1|+ 1}, we deduce by definition that µ(Φ2, β2) = rect(d, tEΣApδ1(σ), µ(Φ1, β1)). Since
µ1 = µ2, δ2 = δ1 and dom(µ1) ∩ img(β2) = ∅, we deduce that rect(d, tEΣApδ1(σ1), η2Apδ2 (σ2) ◦
µ(Φ1, β1)) = η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2) = µ
′
2
.
It remains to prove that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S, D2, N2 and H2. We already know
that σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1 and Σ does not contain tagA-tagged term. There-
fore, since Φ2 = Φ1 · [EΣσ1] then we deduce that Φ2 is an executed frame for D2 ∪ N2 ∪ H2.
Let us prove that for all v ∈ XEΣσ1, Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) 0 Apδ2(v) and Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ FApδ2(Σσ1).
We know (Trα(P0), ∅, id)
Apδ2
(tr2)
=====⇒Apδ2 (σ2)
(Trα2(Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2), η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2)),
(Trα(P0), ∅, id) is secure and there exists ta such that ev(d, ta,XEΣσ1,FΣσ1) ∈ tr1 with all agents
in ta are honest. Hence, applying Definition 15 allows us to conclude.
Rule In: In such a case, Q1 = Q | inA(c, v).RA, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and there exists σ such that
dom(σ) = vars(vσ1) and either vσ1σ ∈ cµ1 or else c ∈ Chp ∪ Chc and Φ1 ⊢ vσ1σ. Moreover, we have
P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1σ and σ2 = σ1σ. Let us first define Q2 = Q | RA. In such a case, we deduce Q2σ2 = P2.
RR n° 8790
50 Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, Eric Le Morvan
Let us now define δ2 = δ1 ∪ δ
′ where δ′ is an injective mapping from tagA-terms that are in σ but
not in σ1 or Φ1 to fresh names of ND. In such a case, we directly have that δ2 is a tagA-mapping of Φ2
and σ2. Moreover, let us define tr2 = tr1, D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, α2 = α1, β2 = β1, η2 = η1.
We directly have that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S, D2, N2 and H2. Since σ2 = σ1σ, then following
Definition 19,we deduce that Q2,Φ2, α2, β2, tr2 and σ2 have conforming events. Moreover we also derive
that η2σ2 = η1σ1σ = µ1σ = µ1 = µ2.
We now show that σ2 is an executed substitution for Φ2. We know that either vσ2 ∈ cη1σ1 or else
Φ1 ⊢ vσ2. In the former case, since η1 only contains fully tagB-terms, we deduce that all tagA-tagged
subterms of vσ2 is a subterm ofσ1 and so the result holds sinceσ1 is an executed substitution forΦ1 = Φ2.
In the latter case, Φ1 ⊢ vσ2 and Lemma 10 directly allow us to conclude.
Since Q is an initial process, by Definition 17, we deduce that either v is a fully tagB-tagged term and
c < img(α1)∪ img(δ1) or v = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp where Σ is a fully tagB-tagged substitution and (E,F)
is an encapsulation. To prove the last property, we do a case analysis:
Case v is a tagB-tagged term and c < img(α1) ∪ img(δ1): Since Q1 = Q | inA(c, v).RA and α1 =
α2, we deduce that Trα1 (Q1) = Trα2 (Q) | inA(c, v).Trα2(RA). But if vσ2 ∈ cη1σ1 then Apδ1(vσ1σ) ∈
Apδ1(cη1σ1). But v and η1 only containing fully tagB-terms implies that Apδ1(vσ1σ) = vApδ1(σ1)Apδ1(σ)
and Apδ1(cη1σ1) = cη1Apδ1(σ1). By definition of δ2, we have that Apδ1(σ) = Apδ2(σ) and so by consid-
ering the substitution Apδ2(σ), we deduce that:
(Trα1(Q1)Apδ1(σ1),Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1))
→
(Trα2(Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2))
The mapping η1Apδ1(σ1) being ground, we have η1Apδ1(σ1) = η1Apδ1(σ1) = η1Apδ2(σ1)Apδ2(σ) =
η2Apδ2(σ2). This allows us to conclude.
Let us now consider the case where Φ1 ⊢ vσ2. We know that δ2 = δ1δ
′, Φ1 = Φ2, D2 = D1, N2 = N2
and H2 = H1. Hence Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) = Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2). By Lemma 16, we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢
Apδ2(vσ2). Once again since v is a fully tagB-tagged term, we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ vApδ2(σ2).
Therefore, by considering the substitution Apδ2(σ), the result holds.
Case v = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp: In this case, by Definition 19, we deduce that there exists a
channel d such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = d. Thus, we deduce that Trα1(Q1) = Trα2 (Q2) | inA(d, tEΣ).Trα2(RA).
Moreover, since c ∈ Chp, we deduce that c < dom(µ1) and Φ1 ⊢ vσ1σ. To conclude the result, we show
that
• if d ∈ Chp then Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2)
• if d ∈ Chc then tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈ dµ(Φ2, β2) or Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2)
• if d ∈ Cha ∪ Chs then tEΣApδ2 (σ2) ∈ dµ(Φ2, β2).
But using the same reasoning as in the case of the rule Out with (Trα0 (P0), ∅, id) being secure and the
execution (P0, ∅, id)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ) being well-formed, we can deduce that if d ∈ Chp then for all k ∈ H,
XEkApδ2(Σk) ∩ XEΣApδ2(σ2) = ∅. However, if d ∈ Chc ∪ Cha ∪ Chs then there exists k ∈ H such that
XEkApδ2(Σk) = XEΣApδ2(σ2). Moreover, we also know that d ∈ Chc (resp. Cha ∪ Chs) implies that (E,F)
allows (resp. does not allow) confidential channels. Thus, by applying Lemma 18, we deduce that:
• if d ∈ Chp then Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2).
• if d ∈ Chc then either there exists k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and EkApδ2(Σk) = EΣApδ2 (σ2) or
Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2). In the former case, by Definition 20, it implies that tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈
dµ(Φ2, β2) hence the result holds.
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• if d ∈ Cha ∪ Chs then there exists k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and EkApδ2(Σk) = EΣApδ2(σ2) and so as
previously, it implies that tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈ dµ(Φ2, β2).
Rule New-k: In such a case, Q1 = Q | new x.RA, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1{
k/x}
where k is a fresh name in NH if A ∈ AgtH else k ∈ ND. Therefore, the result trivially holds with
Q2 = Q | RA{
k/x}, Φ2 = Φ1, δ2 = δ1, η2 = η1, D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, β2 = β1 and α2 =
{((E,F),XEΣ{
k/x})→ c | ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = c}.
Rule New-c: In such a case, Q1 = Q | new c.Q
′, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1{
c′/c}
where c′ is name in Cha (resp. Chc, Chs) if c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc, Chs) and for all I ∈ AgtD, c ∈ chI(Q
′)
else c′ ∈ Chp. Therefore, the result trivially holds with Q2 = Q | RA{
c′/c}, Φ2 = Φ1, δ2 = δ1, η2 = η1,
D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, β2 = β1 and α2 = α1{
c′/c}.
Rule Repl: In such a case, Q1 = Q |!Q
′ where dom(σ1) ∩ vars(Q
′) = ∅, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and
P2 = Qσ1 |!Q
′ | Qρ where ρ is a fresh renaming of variables in Q′. We also know that the variables
in Q1 are bound once. Therefore, the result trivially holds with Q2 = Q |!Q
′ | Qρ, Φ2 = Φ1, δ2 = δ1,
η2 = η1, D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, β2 = β1 and α2 = α1 ◦ {((E,F),XEΣρ) → c | ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = c
and vars(img(Σ)) ∩ dom(ρ) , ∅}.
Other rules: Trivial.
Let S be a set of channels. We say that two process P and Q are composable under S and C′ if
P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn], Q = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] and C[_] = C
′[_]|S for some contexts C[_],C
′[_] and for some
roles Ri,R
′
i
of the same agent, for i = 1 . . .n.
Let tagA and tagB be two disjoint sets of tags. LetSe be a set of tagA-encapsulation allowing authentic,
confidential, and secure channels. Let ρ be a mapping from channels to TAgt × Se. Let P and Q be
two closed executable composable tagB-processes under ρ such that P and Q do not share names and
f a(P) = f a(Q) = ∅. Let P˜ be an annotation of P under ρ. If P˜ is secure and Q preserves secrecy then
P˜ ·ρ Q preserves secrecy as well.
Proof Since P andQ are composable under ρ, let us denote P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] andQ = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n].
Moreover, following Definition 6, let us denote P˜ ·ρ Q = C0[R1.R
′′
1
, . . . ,Rn.R
′′
n ] where C0 = C
C,C′ |S and
R′′
1
, . . . ,R′′n are defined as described in Definition 6 with P˜ = C[R1.ev1(c1, ta1, ts1, tp1), . . . , R˜n.evn(cn, tan, tsn, tpn)].
Let us consider C˜,C1 two contexts such that C˜ and C
′ are composable; and C˜|S = C. Let us denote
C1 = C
C˜,C′ . Note that C0 = C1|S . Lastly, let us define γ a bijective mapping from S to fresh channels of
same kind, that is cθ ∈ Cha (resp. Chc,Chs) is equivalent to c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc,Chs).
We denote by P0 = C1[R˜1.R
′′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′′
n ]. We first show that for all execution (P˜ ·
ρ Q, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒
(P′,Φ, µ)θ there exists P′′ and tr′ such that (P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr′
=⇒ (P′′,Φ, µ)θ is a well-formed execution and tr
is the trace tr′ where we removed the events of the form ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d) with ev ∈ E˜v.
By construction, the differences between P0 and P˜ ·
ρ Q lie the addition of some channel declarations
in C0 and the some events. But the declared channels are not used in any output or input of Ri and R
′′
i
.
Thus, we trivially have that for all execution (P˜ ·ρ Q, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒ (P′,Φ, µ)theta there exists P′′ and tr′
such that (P0, ∅, ∅, θ)
tr′
=⇒ (P′′,Φ, µ, θ) and tr is the trace tr′ where we removed the events of the form
ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d) with ev ∈ E˜v. The existence of a well-formed execution is then given by Lemma 19.
We now show that P0 is an initial process and that there exists α0 a mapping of channels for P0 such
that Trα0 (P0) = C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n]. We already know that P and Q are fully tagB-tagged processes.
Moreover, by Definition 6, we know that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R′′
i
is the process R′
i
where some instances
of outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) are replaced by outA(cpub,Eσ) (resp. inA(cpub,Eσ)) when cρ = (ta, (E,F))
and eventA(e˜vi(d, ta,XEσ,Fσ, c)) is in R˜i for some substitution σ. By Definition 17, we deduce that P0 is
initial.
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Moreover, let us define α0 such mapping such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all instances of outA(c, u)
(resp. inA(c, u)) in R
′
i
, if eventA(evi(d, ta,XEσ,Fσ, c)) is in R˜i and cρ = (ta, (E,F)) for some ta, c, (E,F)
then ((E,F),XEσ)α0 = c. Since by Definition 4, cρ = (ta, (E,F)) implies that c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc,Chs) is
equivalent to (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels. Therefore, we can deduce from
Definition 18 that α0 is a mapping of channels for P0. Lastly, following Definition 18 and Definition 6,
we directly obtain that Trα0 (P0) = C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n].
Let us now prove that (Trα0(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅) is secure. We know that P˜ is secure. But the properties of
Definition 8 are all reachability properties which are preserved by parallel composition. Hence, we have
that (P˜ | Q, ∅, ∅, ∅) = (C[R˜1, . . . , R˜n] | C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n], ∅, ∅, ∅) is secure. But we know that P and Q do not
share any names and channels(C1) ∩ channels(R1, . . . ,Rn) ∩ channels(R
′
1
, . . . ,R′n) = ∅. Thus, a simple
induction allows us to prove that (C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n], ∅, id,=)(Trα0 (P0), ∅, ∅)∅ is secure.
With the same reasoning as above, we can prove that (C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n], ∅, ∅, ∅) = (Trα0(P0),
∅, ∅, ∅) preserves the secrecy of some term t shared by some agents A1, . . . , An. We now show that
(P0, ∅, id) also preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An.
Let (P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒σ (P
′,Φ, µ)θ a well formed execution, and agent B and an eventSec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))
such that (B,Sec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))) ∈ tr and Φ ⊢ t
′. By Lemma 20, we deduce that there exists an initial
process U, a mapping of channels α (resp. β) for U (resp. Φ), and η, δ, D, N and H such that:
• Uσ = P; and
• ησ = µ and η only contains fully tagB-terms; and
• U, Φ, α, β, tr and σ have conforming events; and
• Φ is a well formed frame for Se, D, N and H; and
• σ is an executed substitution for Φ; and
• δ is a tagA-mapping of Φ and σ; and
• (Trα(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅)
Apδ(tr)
====⇒Apδ(σ) (Trα(U)Apδ(σ),Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ), ηApδ(σ) ◦ µ(Φ, β), θ)
But (B,Sec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))) ∈ tr implies that (B,Sec(Apδ(t
′), (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))) ∈ Apδ(tr). Moreover,
by Lemma 16 and Definition 13, Φ ⊢ t′ implies that Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t
′). This is a contradiction with
the fact that (Trα0(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅) also preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An. Therefore, (P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
indeed preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An.
Note that in P0 the channels channels(C1) r channels(C) do not appear in any R˜i.R
′′
i
, for i = 1..n. As
such, removing them still preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An. Lastly, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
the difference between R˜i and Ri is the addition of some event ev that are different from the event Sec,
removing them also preserves secrecy meaning that C[R1.R
′′
1
, . . . ,Rn.R
′′
n ] = P˜ ·
ρ Q preserves the secrecy
of t shared by A1, . . . , An. This allows us to conclude.
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